744; The Alids, A Better Caliphate

[z.g.a.]

What about the religious development? How would the demographics look like and how would the different sects of islam develop? also what would the caliphs religious views and approaches to other sects be like?

 

[wakobear]

What about the religious development? How would the demographics look like and how would the different sects of islam develop? also what would the caliphs religious views and approaches to other sects be like?

Basically, there would be no major Sunni-Shia split.

Upon taking power, the messianic fervour of the revolution would begin die down, as the new regime seeks to gain support of the moderate Muslim masses. As occured with the Abbasids OTL.

Though, this disappointed the Shia supporters of the Abbasids, who wished to see a divinely appointed messianic Caliph who would usher in a just Islamic society upon the earth.
Mansur was the complete opposite of this ideal, styling himself as a secular monarch, like that of the Umayyads, not appealing to the messianic imam-caliph the Shia were looking for. Leading them to look to the Alids to bring about the ummah led by a divinely guided imam. Though Mansur's son alMahdi and later Ma'mun pushed more for the religious connotations of their rule to win support of the Alids. Eventually leading to the state enforced Mutazila school, which gave the caliph ability to interpret the Qur'an and sunnah independently.


But ITTL, Abdullah alKamil had been cultivating the messianic/Mahdi status of Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah for decades. So they would have more messianic overtones than the Abbasids.
Perhaps a 2 faced situation could occur, with Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah appearing moderate in public, but to his private supporters being more messianic - these would be his bodyguards and most loyal troops, since they would see him as their Mahdi and be more than willing to sacrifice their lives, sort of like the Qizilbash to Shah Ismail. Overall, giving them a far more loyal powerbase than the Abbasids who only had the Khurasani who were mostly under Abu Muslim.....

This messianic and divinely appointed claim as well as the ability to interpret Qur'an and sunnah independently, would result in a much more authoritarian and despotic Caliphate. With no limits whatsoever on Caliphal power, due to it being perceived as divine will. Objectors may be put down by the zealots, since objecting to their Mahdi would be a form of blasphemy.....


OTL Jafar as-Sadiq taught Abu Hanifa and Imam Malik. ITTL, he could be appointed as the grand judge, thereby unifying schools of jurisprudence even more.


Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah would try to include all branches of the Hashimids. Hassanids, Husainids, Abbasids and even descendants of Jafar ibn abi Talib whose great grandson Abdullah ibn Muawiyah led a major Alid revolt in the 3rd fitnah in 747.
With the majority of all governors throughout the Caliphate being from amongst the Hashimids - making the Caliphate based on the unity of the Hashimids family. (Saffah did the same thing, but kept it only within the Abbasid family)

By doing this, Shia disappointed with the regime don't have another major Hashimids to turn to, since they are all integral parts of the Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah's government.
They may find a stray Hashimid from a small cadet branch and push their ideology upon him. But this wouldn't gain much support from the Shia masses, let alone the rest of the Muslim world.
Overtime these small groups around obscure Alids would become more ghulat/extreme like the Alawites or Druze or Qizilbash etc. But as they become more extreme, they would gain more opposition from the government who would eventually have to confront them.

A much larger problem would be succession disputes. Causing not only a political rift, but also an ideological one as occured with the Fatimid Caliphate. Which could result in completely different sects forming like the Nizari-Musta'li schism. Which may begin to split apart theologically too and if left long enough to fester could potentially break the state apart.
But generally, this Alid Caliphate would be less Shia than the Fatimids, since Shi'ism is still in its formative stages, and much of Fatimid Shi'ism's beliefs haven't been invented yet, and since the Alids rule the Caliphate said beliefs are unlikely to ever emerge.


The Khawarij would reject the Caliphate of Muhammad Nafs Zakiyyah, since they consider Ali as Kaafir. With the Shia outlet gone, this would probably be the dominant sect for ideological dissenters of the regime. Though I still see them as quite small, since kharijism never gained much popularity.

The Khawarij of the Maghreb (Sufris and Ibadis) would've already been co-opted into the regime by Ibrahim ibn Abdullah. Leaving their only dominant position in isolated Oman and Sistan.



Due to the significant Umayyad remnant ITTL, I could see the Umayyads developing an AbdManaf-id ideology. Since AbdManaf is the Father of Banu Hashim, but he's also the grandfather of Umayyah progenitor of the Banu Umayyah. Thereby including both Hashimids and Umayyads. This ideology becoming dominant amongst the Syrians who were the 3rd military power within the state after Berbers and Khurasani.
A few decades after the revolution, when the Umayyad rule is becoming a distant memory to the Shia, perhaps pressuring the government to adopt a portion of the AbdManaf-id ideology so that Umayyads are more integrated into the ruling class....



If the state tries to push Shi'ism too much, imposing an inquisition like the mihna, then there would likely be mass protests and civil unrest, as occurred with OTL mihna. Potentially the staunchly anti Shia Syrians could cause an armed revolt. So i don't see them pushing it too hard.



But overall, I see Muhammad Nafs azZakiyyah being accepted by the majority of the Muslim world. With no major ideological objections. Unless succession disputes result in theological schisms....

Demographics:​

After the conquest of the Gangetic, Hinduism would be the largest religion in the Caliphate. Followed by Christianity, then probably Buddhism (Central Asia would Buddhist. While Sindh and Bengal were also Buddhists though with significant influence from Hinduism) then Zoroastrianism or Islam, then Judaism then small religions like Manichaeism etc.

Not including north India, the population is probably around 50 million. The conquest of North India probably doubles that to 100 million. Over 1/3 of the world.



Of the Muslims, the Arabs are the majority, but second are the Amazigh/Berbers.
Their islamification was a unique process, mainly done by Abu Muhajir Dinar in 670s and Musa ibn Nusayr in the early 700s due to his manpower shortages. By 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad's invasion force being almost solely Berber. And by 740 all the Berbers seem to have embraced Islam, at least nominally, despite very few of them having ever met an actual Arab, since the Arabs were centred on Qayrawan, with almost zero settlement in the central or western maghreb (Algeria and Morocco respectively).

This means they were barely Arabised, knowing very little Arabic. Since they would be the largest army in the Caliphate, and dominate the entire west (from Andalus all the way to Egypt and Syrian coast), this could lead to tensions between the Arabs and their Berber overlords.
By comparison, the Khurasani army was mainly made up of Arab settlers who lived in Khurasan. While there was a significant portion of Iranians, these would've been much more Arabised than the Berbers, since Arab settlement was much larger and more dispersed in Khurasan, and marriage/integration of Arabs with locals seems to have been more common.

Though overtime, as cities are developed in the western and central Maghreb as well as maritime trade and industry, a large number of Arabs would migrate from the middle east to the rich Maghreb and Iberia. Which OTL didn't happen, since the abbasids didn't control past Ifriqiyah. Leading to urban Arab centres, which would gradually Arabise the berbers.

Since something like the Banu Hilal invasions wouldn't happen, as the Maghreb is much stronger and unified, the rural and Saharan populations of the Maghreb would probably remain much more Berber than OTL.




In India, it is an Arab Islam which has conquered northern India. Not the Persianate Islam of OTL under Ghaznavids, Ghurids, Delhi Sultanate and Mughals, who used Arabic as a liturgical language and Persian as the high culture language.
The sheer wealth of India would mean that much of the formative Arabic cultural efflorescence would occur in the metropolises of India, on par with the Iraqi contribution. With Indian Cultures heavily influencing early arabic culture, much more so than Persian culture, which would be relegated to Transoxiana/Khurasan and the poor and arid Iranian plateau, being on the receiving end of Indian cultural influences, instead of the giving end. Which is completely different to OTL.

This would mean Indian sciences, particularly the Hindu numerals, mathematics and astronomy of Brahmagupta, would enter the Muslim world much faster. Similarly the brilliant linguistic works of Panini would make Arabic linguistics more developed, as Panini came up with many advanced concepts which other linguists didn't come up with until the 19th century.
And Indian philosophies would be given more weight than OTL. Though as the Greek works are translated Indian philosophical though will have to compete with that of the Greeks. Perhaps creating more interesting and dynamic philosophies.


Islamification of India would be slow and gradual. With Muslims only being dominant in the cities, as in most regions. Though conversion would probably faster among the already declining Buddhist populations of Sindh and Bihar/Bengal, whose urban trade networks were being usurped by the newly arrived Muslims.

If a major Arab Bedouin migration (similar on scale to Banu Hilal) to the Thar desert, then much of Rajasthan, Sindh, southern Punjab, northern Gujarat and other regions surrounding the Thar desert would arabise and islamify significantly faster. Fromwhich regions surrounding those would also Arabise and so on.
Bedouin typically had little Islamic knowledge, and followed tribal law. So in India, after mixing and integrating with the local Hindus, perhaps some aspects of Hinduism or Rajput tribal law will affect these Bedouin?

Much of India at this time was covered in this forest. So if a policy similar to that of the Mughals in East Bengal: clearing forest, establishing agricultural villages headed by a Muslim, underwhom the inhabitants of the village would islamify. Then much of India could be converted. But this would still take centuries.

Indian traders would probably dominate the city of Basra, and other Persian Gulf, Arabian Peninsula and perhaps red sea ports. So there may some Hinduism practiced in those cities privately.


At the time, India had a huge connection to South East Asia, which had significant Buddhist Hindu influence. So Hindus may migrate to SEA in significant quantities to escape Muslim rule. Or Muslim traders may begin the islamification process of SEA centuries earlier. Or if a direct invasion of Srivijaya occurs from Caliphal Bengal, similar to the Chola's, for more control over the trade routes.

Then the Caliphate itself would be present in SEA, appointing governors and administering the region. Islam now challenging Hinduism and Buddhism, both of which were still in fairly formative stages, as was the political landscape with the first major kingdoms beginning to emerge now and most of their fertile farmland still being beneath dense forest, gradually being cultivated, increasing wealth, population and cultural developments as a whole. Islam being introduced now in such a formative era could potentially prevent the rise of Hinduism and Buddhism.

SEA seafaring technologies like the incredibly fast Trimarans and Catamarans could brought westwards along with Southeast Asian sailors, for much quicker communications between Andalus and the middle east or India and Iraq. Strengthening central control over these distant regions.


The early Caliphate having outposts in Sumatra and other regions of SEA would allow much more trade with China. As well as with Korea and Japan which OTL didn't receive many Arab traders. Japan was in quite a formative stage, so the interactions with Muslims traders could cause some significant butterflies, culturally and religiously


As for the court culture, then this would be heavily influenced by that of the Tang after the arrival of Princess Qizhaoyi and the Cui clan. Since they had the most developed court and administrative structure on the world at the time.
Probably with Chinese classics and Confucian texts being translated, affecting Arab culture




As for Europe, then most of it is still pagan: the Basques, all the Slavics, the northern and some of the eastern Germanics, Avars, Picts, Finno-Ugrics etc.
ITTL the united Caliphate controls Iberia and Maghreb, making their position in Europe much stronger. And could potentially aid these Pagans against their Christian enemies/neighbours in exchange for conversion.
As for the Basques, the perhaps using them as a minority rulers over the romance speaking Christian majorities of upper Spain and southwestern France, if they convert. Basque naval expertise could also come in great use to the Caliphate for Atlantic raids.

Otherwise it would be slow and gradual. Though, being connected to the central Muslim world means more Arab/Muslim migration to iberia. Which history only seems to have received 2 influxes: in 711 initial invasion and 742 when Balj ibn Bishr escaped the Berber revolt. It wasn't centuries later when Berber migration took place in the late 900s, though solely as military forces. With larger migrations after the AlMoravids conquest.
Since it's connected, and the Maghreb is unified, safe and prosperous, more Muslims would migrate to Iberia, making its conversion faster.







Unlike OTL, in which post 13th century Sufi mystics mainly spread Islam to India and SEA, with a great deal of syncretism taking place until reform movements in the 19th century, early Islam was much less like that, so the Islam of these disparate regions would be more theologically similar to one another.
Thus, in a much more expanded and unified empire, the travels of hadeeth scholars in the 9th century would be much more extensive. Instead of being dominated by Persians (all 6 major hadeeth books are by Persians), other groups would take a much more important role. Especially the Berbers and northwest Indians. As well as the more distant Andalusis and the northeast Indians.

This greater interaction should unify Islam more on the whole. (It would also give some interesting Nisbas) As well as make it's judicial system more robust, since there are more people's living in varied lands and cultures which have different problems than what OTL peoples of the Islamic world.were going through. Problems/situations which would need to be addressed by Islamic jurisprudence.

 

[Nivek]

Nisbas

Very interesting the different nisbas and rulling, that alone is another Titanic butterfly

 

[wakobear]

Another point, Matrilineal lineage would be more important, since the Alids trace their lineage through Fatima, daughter of the prophet. It is this which makes their claim unique among other Hashimids. Otherwise, through Ali alone, the Abbasids, even Jafarids and other branches of the Banu Hashim have an equally strong claim.

OTL, the Abbasids tried pushing the superiority of patrilineal lineage, and weakened that of matrilineal to strengthen their claim. With female members of the Alids being less important thereafter, as mentioned by Teresa Bernheimer.


Stronger Matrilineal lineage means the role of women in the Islamic world would be more important. But overall the effect of this would probably be fairly small.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Have to say, looking back, I'm surprised this is pretty much the only thread with any discussion of the Alids coming to power in Islam's early history.

One thing I'd want to note here -- even putting the Sindh are India aside entirely, the vast majority of the Caliphate's population at this time was non-muslim; AIUI, Christian majorities in Egypt, the Levant, and Spain persisted for centuries after their conquest. Combine that with the Alids going with a more "divine right" approach to political governance likely tying into the role of scripture, and you very well may have a religion too tightly connected to elite government and trade to find the kind of mass appeal that allowed it to eventually become the majority in their realm OTL.

- - - - -

I don't think much would change to be honest.

Muhammad bin Abdullah "al-Nafs al-Zakiyya" was a supremely convincing candidate for an Hashemite Caliph, in some respects the great hope of that house. The sources make it pretty clear that Muhammad's father Abdullah was cultivating a messianic aura around his son from the day he was born. The boy sat at the very center of the Alid bloodlines, being descended from Imam Hasan paternally and Imam Hussein maternally; which meant (as he frequently reminded people) he counted the Prophet Muhammad as his ancestor twice over.

He was famously big and strong, handsome, had a egg-sized mole on his back (a characteristic shared with the Prophet Muhammad, whose mole was called the Seal of Prophethood) and a stutter that was compared to the Prophet Moses. Many of these traits (particularly the stutter) have found their way into general expectations for the Mahdi which are repeated by Islamic scholars to this very day. Just to illustrate how high hopes were, Abū l-Faraj al-Iṣfahānī recorded the following verse, written by an anonymous source about a newborn Muhammad b. Abdullah:

Another verse from Salama b. Aslum al-Juhanī reads:


Furthermore, Muhammad b. Abdullah assuming the Caliphate was probably the plan all along. Allegedly, the big men of the Banu Hashim, including Ibrahim 'al-Mahdi' of the Abbasids (but not Imam Jafar al-Sidiq), had paid him allegiance before the beginning of what we now call the Abbasid Revolution. In order to prevent a repeat of previous failed Hashemite rebellions, none of the leaders of the clan were actually fighting in the revolution. The whole thing was organized by a shadowy figure who called himself Abu Muslim Al-Khorosani (a name that literally just means 'Papa Muslim from the East') and the actual fighting was a confused affair, with the Umayyads not even really being sure whether they were fighting Iranian Muslims, Shi'i rebels, or Zoroastrians. Eventually once the Umayyads were beaten, the rampaging army (who dressed in black, mostly didn't speak Arabic and carried clubs they called "infidel-bashers") basically loitered around old Ctesiphon and al-Rumiyya (where the first Abassid palace would be set up) waiting for the redeeming figure of the Mahdi to appear. Only instead of the beautiful and charismatic Muhmmad the Alid arriving from Medina as planned, it was the Abd'Allah "al-Saffah" the Abassid who filled the power vaccuum.

Muhammad b. Abdullah was outraged and publically challenged the new Caliph in the form of a letter which was read publically and is recorded in Al-Tabari:


So all in all, it's not hard to imagine a scenario in which the Caliphate was claimed by an Alid in the time period you're talking about. In fact, one could argue it was more likely than what happend in OTL. Of the course the problem Muhammad b. Abdullah's rebellion was that he was trapped in the Hejaz which produces little manpower and almost no food. The Abbasid armies were centered in Iraq and cut him off from what should've been his real wellspring of power; the hordes of Khorosani Muslims, outraged over the death of Abu Muslim, who launched several rebellions of their own, and a few new religions like Khurramism.

But let's say the rebellion of Muhammad 'al-Nafs al-Zakiyya' suceeded, or that the alleged betrayal never occured and he took the Caliphate. What happens next?

It seems to me that at this stage Shi'ism and Sunnism don't really exist as theologies, but political idealogies on who should lead the Muslims and whence they should derive their authority. The common assumption is to view Sunni Islam as the original orthodoxy and Shi'ism as a heresy which branched off somewhere in the Rashidun period but it's more accurate to say that Sunnism and Shi'ism developed alongside each other in the early Abbasid period under the auspices of people like Imam Jafar al-Sidiq (imo the real founder of Shi'ism as we understand it today), Imam Malik (a student of Imam Jafar; founder of Maliki Sunnism) and Imam Abu Hanifa (another student of Imam Jafar; founder of Hanafi Sunnism). Before this period we should really see Muslims as fundamentally a single school without such formal divisions and ideas percolating among the proto-sects that would latter grow into Sunnism and Shi'ism. So if Muhammad b. Abdullah's rebellion suceeds the simple answer is the definition of Shia probably stops including people from the Hasanid line. This is the exact same as how early Shi'ite movements were mostly for keeping the Caliphate in the hands of the Banu Hashim, but once a Hashemite got the throne the definition changed to only mean the Alids (not the Abbasids who were actually ruling).

Shi'ism in it's early stage is fundamentally an ideology of rebellion against tyranny; all of the ideas in proto-Shi'ite groups at this stage center around the utopian age that will arrive when the rightful Imam is allowed to rule. Obviously when your Imam does get to rule, and inevitably falls short of those impossible standards, you either have to fold into the mainstream current of Islam (proto-Sunni; i.e. the Caliphate is working just fine at the moment thank you very much, please stop rebelling) or re-evaluate and throw your lot in with a different line of Imams. This is what happend in OTL as the mainstream Hashimiyya/Kaysanites basically disapeared in favour of the Imami (which became what we would now call Twelvers and Ismailis/Seveners) branch of Shi'ism, and exactly what would've happened if an Alid did end up becoming Caliph.

Very interesting! Thank you for such a detailed response.
So say the political disputes between Sunni and Shia then are likely mediated during Muhammad bin Abdullahs rule. In such a scenario I have a hard time seeing how Shia dissidents would appear or develop separately from the Caliphate (granted, I do have very limited knowledge of Islamic history). Wouldn't most, if not all, Shia Imams support bin Abdulah? As they come from his family and tribe I assume they would be granted political influence during his rule, enough power to placate them.

Not really, at this point there the Shi'i identity is still fluid. A modern analogy would be how the atrocities committed by the Soviet Union did not lead to the discrediting of socialism as a whole. When the first socialist revolution did not create the utopian society that socialists were expecting one would expect that would kill socialism forever, right? On the contrary, socialism still exists but modern socialists generally disavow Stalinist-style autocratic socialism in favour of more democratic flavours, even refusing to define Stalin's actions as socialism at all.

In the same way, the when Hashimiyya (who were the main branch of Shia before the Abbasid revolution) got their Imam on the throne, they were shocked and dismayed at the way he ruled as Caliph. His murder of Abu Muslim was the most obvious offence but really any ruler, including Muhammad "al-Nafs al-Zakiyya" bin Abdullah would've fallen short of the messianic expectations Shi'ites had for their Imams. When this happened (as it would inevitably happen ITTL) the Hashimiyya either abandoned the Shi'i idea of the utopian society (as some socialists abandoned socialism) and fell into Sunni streams of thought, or they disavowed the Hashimiyya line of Imams for a different flavour of Shi'ism (generally the Imami sect led by Jafar al-Sidiq), some of them even abandoned Islam as a whole in favour of Nativist Iranian movements (led mostly by associates of Abu Muslim, in Khorosan and Armenia).

So no, an Alid Caliph will not destroy Shi'ism; just redefine it.

Ascertaining the character of the early Shi’i is complex. Until the revolt of Al-Mukhtar during the Second Fitna, they constituted a unified group of those zealously loyal to the cause of Ali and his descendants (and family in general). It is understood that the fundamentals of Shi’i religious belief, as opposed to merely political opposition, became solidified with Imam Ja’far, nonetheless there is evidence to suggest a theological dimension being present as early as the actual reign of Ali as Caliph. The concept of hereditary sanctity within the Prophet’s family as well as Yemeni traditions of divine kingship would formulate a consensus amongst Ali’s partisans that the salvation and delivery from distress might best be guaranteed by following a charismatic leader in possession of certain divinely ordained or infallible attributes. Mu’awiya’s victory against Ali and his son Hasan compounded with Hasan’s martyrdom following Karbala, infused into the Shi’i community religious fevor as well as solidifying a sense of martyrdom and need for repentance. Although not fully distinguishable from the rest of the Muslim community, it is apparent that from inception there was at least some form of religious/theological dimension which distinguished the Shi’a from other political allies of the Banu Hashim.

In proclaiming Muhammad bin al-Hanifiyya, Ali’s son by Khawla of Banu Hanifa, as Mahdi (‘the divinely-guided one’), Al-Mukhtar spearheaded an important doctrinal innovation. Although have being previously utilised to denote Ali and his sons honorifically, it’s usage introduced (or at the least expanded upon) a messianic element within Shi’i belief, justifying Mukhtar’s revolt on the behalf of a saviour-imam who would establish justice on earth and thus deliver the oppressed from tyranny. Such rhetoric proved increasingly effective amongst the Mawali, a large discontented and disenfranchised milieux under Ummayad rule; they would be recruited into the ranks of the Shi’i, eventually serving as Al-Muktar’s final base of support as Kufan Arabs proved reluctant to support the integration of the Mawali and or defected to Al-Zubayr or the Ummayads. Even with his defeat and subsequent erosion of Shi’i leadership, Al-Muktar’s revolt propagated Shi’i tendencies amongst the Mawali populace, consequently resulting in the acculturation of old Babylonian, Judaeo-Christian, and Irano-Zoroastrian ideals into the Shi’i community, as well as transforming its base of adherents into a dynamic movement with some form of doctrine as opposed to the predominately Arab limited membership that had once defined it.

Another consequence of Mukhtar’s revolt serves as the center of this discussion; the Shi’i community in the prelude to the Abbasid revolution. No longer bound by a uniform and coherent recognition of a line of Imams, internal divisions would emerge revolving around who constituted Ahl-Al-Bayt and was this qualified to lead the Muslim community under divine guidance. Shi’i branches were accordingly divided between Ali’s sons of Fatimid descent (themselves split with Hasanid and Husaynid branches), Ali’s Hanafid son, Ali’s cousins through his paternal uncles such as the Abbasids, even from his own Talabid nephews. Within this increasingly schismatic environment emerged two general trends including the radical Kasaniya and moderate Shi’i movement of Al-Baqir.

Dominated by the Mawali and predominately based in southern Iraq and the east, the Kaysaniya effectively evolved out of Al-Mukhtar’s revolt, being defined by the radical revolutionary flare that Al-Mukhtar had initially succeeded in arousing on behalf of Ibn Hanifiyya. Concepts such as the occultation and re-emergence of the Imam as well as a clearly eschatological definition of the Mahdi were formulated by early Kaysani writers, indeed the particularly radical strands of thought that developed would be designated even by other Shi’i scholars as ghuluw (exaggeration) due to their beliefs on divinity, superhuman qualities, designation of the Prophethood etc. Amongst the radicals numerous schisms would occur, indeed it would better to understand the Kayasaniyya as a set of inter-related groups. By the time of the Abbasid Revolution, most radicals had aligned themselves with the Abbasid branch of the Banu Hashim under the basis that Abu Hashim (Ibn Haniffiya’s eldest son and Imam of the Muslims according to most of his former followers) had pledged the Immate to the Abbasids upon his death in 716. Those who disputed the testament such as the Harbiya, Bayaniya and “pure Kasaniyya” etc, rapidly disintegrated or gradually integrated into Persian syncretic sects.

On the other hand, there was a small moderate faction of pious Arabs that coalesced around the quietist son of Husayn: Zayn Al-Abidin, following the death of Ibn Hanifiyya. Upon his own death, his son Al-Baqir would accede to the Imamate, not without challenge however from his half-uncle Zayd bin Ali and the Hasanid Muhammad bin Abdullah “Al-Nafs Al-Zakkiya.” Al-Baqir, leading this faction of moderate proto-Imamis, primarily focused on expanding the rudiments of Shi’i legal thought, teaching on legal and ritual aspects of Islam which would later comprise many of the features which were later regarded as distinctive aspects of the Imamiya. Following his death, his following (which comprised a number of Ghuluw theorists), fractured into those who awaited his return as the Mahdi, those who aligned with Nafs Al-Zakkiya and those who aligned with Al-Baqir’s eldest son, Ja’far Al-Sadiq. As the Ummayad realm became increasingly vulnerable, Zayd bin Ali would stage his failed revolt in 740. Zaydi groups would thus align themselves with Nafs Al-Zakkiya, as did the bulk of Ghuluw groups that had followed Al-Baqir.

Under the premise that it is instead Nafs Al-Zakkiya that accedes to the Caliphate, now presumably denoted as Al-Khilafa Al-Alawiya (Alid Caliphate), the trajectory of the Shi’i community is fundamentally altered. Perhaps Abu Salama lobbies Nafs Al-Zakkiya instead of the other reluctant Alid candidates to accede to the Caliphate, either way the Mawla radicals of the Kaysani/Hashmiya (aligned with the Abbasids and their Khursayni army) may prove to be obstructive and a potential threat to the new Caliph. Supposing that they are suppressed, or alternatively placated (granting their allegiance to the new administration), it is possible that these Shi’i groups may either align with the new Caliph or dissipate into syncretic sects as occurred in Persia. Anti-Bin Abduallah splinter groups may also maintain and develop radical ghuluw elements to form offshoots sects akin to Qarmatians, Druze or modern day Nusayri/Alawi community. Moreover, should the Alid Revolution represent the collapse of the Umayyad social order, predilected on Arab supremacy, the emancipation of the Mawali resolves one of the most pressing issues espoused by revolutionary Shi’i tendencies. In the case that it does not and instead the Mawali remain a discontented social class, the radical Shi’i may continue to identify with the aspirations of Non-Arab Muslims, perhaps coalescing around a, or even a number of, alternative Alid (or Hashemite) Imam(s).

Whether or not the new Alid Caliphate maintains its revolutionary zeal remains in question. Known for his militancy and messianic claims, Nafs Al-Zakkiya certainty commanded directly loyalty amongst the activist Shi’i, as opposed to the Abbasids who enjoyed revolutionary support through individuals such as Abu Muslim and Abu Salama. Nonetheless, practicality remains pivotal, upon their ascension the Abbasids disregarded and even persecuted Shi’i elements as a means of appealing to the wider Community. It would be plausible that this new Alid dynasty be compelled to carry out similar measures, yet perhaps not to the same extent. Alternatively, the position of Imam and Caliph may become synonymous, with a greater emphasis on the divine ordinance of Caliphal authority. Regardless, an Alid dynasty would most likely not go to the extent of the Abbasids in totally breaching with their Shi’i roots, particularly since they gain little benefit in forsaking their original narrative (unlike the Abbasids who under Caliph Muhammad Al-Mahdi proclaimed that the Caliphate had been endowed by the Prophet to his uncle Abbas).

Having averted the ultimate disappointment that was the Abbasid Revolution (as well as the precaution and murder of many Alid members of the Banu Hashim), the circumstances that permitted Imam Ja’far’s rise to pre-eminence amongst the Shia are stunted. With the Hanafid line extinct, the Abbasids likely suppressed and Nafs Al-Zakkiya now at the helm of authority, it is likely that the majority of Shi’a would at least initially coalesce around him. Nevertheless, Ja’far was already a prominent figure, renowned for his personality and intellect. Effectively, he would have been the second most notable Alid of the era, in such an environment his teachings could perhaps be actively propagated by the state. Such would not necessarily alienate other jurists and scholars considering that he was accepted as a teaching authority by quite a wide number of non-Shi’i partisans. Indeed, it is reported (although not without controversy and dispute) that Abu Hanifa and Malik bin Anas, the eponymous founders of the Maliki and Hanafi schools of fiqh respectively, studied under or consulted him. Nevertheless, the doctrine that Ja’far and his prodigies, many of whom were prominent Ghuluw theorists while others Mutkalamin (scholars of Kalam), developed, which effectively became the fundamentals of Shi’i religious thought, maintains principles such as the nature of the Immate and religious dissimulation (taqiya) that were far from amenable to many scholars in spite of the formative and fluid nature of Islamic theology of the era. Navigating the already complex religious environment may become further complicated with Ja’fari fiqh and theological concepts such as the Exoteric vs Esoteric (Zahir vs Batin) etc, infused into the crystallisatizing fissures between the Ulema.

There may, alternatively, be little impetus for Nafs Al-Zakiya to promote Ja’far, particularly since he represents a potential challenge to the title of Caliph/Imam in spite of his political quietism. In the case that Ja’far is disposed of, so is the nexus of Shi’i religious thought. Fundamentally, this could totally alter the religious and idea logical trajectory of the moderate proto-Imami branch, perhaps serving to the benefit of the radical/Kasaniya remnants. Considering, however, that Ja’far operated under the Abbasids (who had no qualm in persecuting Shi’i tendencies and Alid opposition) for up to two decades, it is perhaps more likely that he is permitted to continue his efforts. A clear schism could emerge between the lines of Imam, presuming that the new Alid dynasty even maintains such title, with Ja’far cultivating support from radicals aborting the cause of Nafs Al-Zakkiya. A re-ignition of the division between the Hasanid line, embodied by the new Alid dynasty, and the Husaynid line of Ja’far, raises interesting theological and religious possibilities.

Another avenue if speculation appears dependant on Alid policy. The socio-economic environment that permitted the proliferation of Ismailism for example was largely a result of the societal and economic shifts that had occurred under the Abbasids, in which the expansion of commerce and activity compounded with the erosion of the Arab tribal elite’s authority created an environment in which the former garrison towns transformed into flourishing urban centres ruled over by a multi-racial elite of religious intelligentsia, merchants, landowners, military men etc. This in turn exacerbated conflicts of interest as the interests of landowning urbanities became sharply divorced from those in the rural country, particularly those of landless peasantry and Bedouin settlers. The malcontented masses, including the urban proletariat, were thus naturally attractable to any movement opposed to the established order, as reflected by the propensity for revolt during the era. Millennialist tendencies rooted in Messianic rhetoric proved to enjoy significant appeal. Indeed, the Ismaili’s propagated a message a message centred on imminent emergence of the Mahdi who would establish the rule of justice in the world,a promise of effectively unrooting the oppression experienced. In light of these consequences, the question emerges on the religious character of potential anti-Caliphal dissent. If the Alid Caliphate experiences such an extensive shift, which is well within the realm of possibility, it could be the Zaydis who rise to become the most prominent of Shi’i groups, with the radical (and militant) Jurudiya amongst their ranks proliferating across disadvantaged communities within the Muslim world. The Kharijites also are obvious contenders. Indeed, it is likely that revolutionary Shi’ism may experienced a major rejuvenation.

Whether these Shi’i groups resemble OTL, I would postulate that they would not.

 

[wakobear]

Have to say, looking back, I'm surprised this is pretty much the only thread with any discussion of the Alids coming to power in Islam's early history.

There are some threads which deal with Alid victory in first and second fitnahs.
But after that they fizzle out. Which is surprising since I think this is the most realistic and plausible chance at the Alids winning the Caliphate. Just replacing abbasids with Alids.

One thing I'd want to note here -- even putting the Sindh are India aside entirely, the vast majority of the Caliphate's population at this time was non-muslim; AIUI, Christian majorities in Egypt, the Levant, and Spain persisted for centuries after their conquest.

Of course.
The only people's who have converted en masse are the Arabs, and the Berbers - who appear to have all converted, at least nominally, by 740, since in the aftermath of the great Berber revolt when almost every single Arab was expelled from central and western Maghreb they still retained Islam.

Everywhere else in the Caliphate would take centuries to convert. With Urban centres converting first.
Certain groups like the Transoxianans converted quicker than others, due to extensive Arab-native intermarriage. So Eastern Persia converted faster than western Persia, despite being closer.
Or the Buddhists of Sindh, whose urban commercial networks were being challenged by the Arab traders.

Most of greater Persia seems to have become Muslim by the 950-1000.
In Andalus this was reached around 1050-1100.
Egypt took longer probably around 1200, due to the small Arab settlement initially, as well as the tight-knit Coptic community.

Some regions like Armenia/Georgia never converted, due to lack of Arab settlement, with the Muslims restricted to the garrison cities of Dvin and Tbilisi.

Combine that with the Alids going with a more "divine right" approach to political governance likely tying into the role of scripture, and you very well may have a religion too tightly connected to elite government and trade to find the kind of mass appeal that allowed it to eventually become the majority in their realm OTL.

- - - - -

OTL, in early Islam, religious beliefs were very decentralised, with individual scholars of diverse social backgrounds (many being freed slaves) influencing Islamic thought. Not the state/Caliphs.

The first and only major attempt to impose a belief by the government was the Mutazila inquisition (Mihna), to try and allow the Caliph himself to interpret Islamic law, without need of the scholars. But it was only accepted by the elites largely to show loyalty to the regime.
With the masses and the sidelined elites (the Khurasanis of Baghdad [Abna] who had been dropped by Mutasim in favour of Turkic slaves) vehemently opposing the inquisition.
And the vastness of the Abbasid realm meant that they were only able to enforce it in the capital Baghdad/Samarra. With Samanids, Aghlabids and other provincial governors being anti-mutazila.



But ITTL, the Alids have a much larger support base than alMutasim. So the increasing of the sanctity/holiness of the Caliphal office would probably be widely accepted.
But if the Caliph tries to enforce his personal interpretation of the Qur'an, and downplay the role of Hadeeth, the Sunni majority would riot.
The Anti-Alid Syrian armies, though defeated are still formidable, supporting the Sunnis similar to how the Abna did during the Mihna.
Similarly, the Berber half of the Caliphate would still have significant khariji tendencies, specifically egalitarianism, opposing the enforcement of the Caliph's religious opinions.
This would probably even stir discontent among other Alids, such as Jafar ibn Abi Talib who taught both Abu Hanifa and Malik.


So I think it wouldn't be pushed that far, leaving it to the scholars.



But I don't think the Caliph pushing a more divine right policy would affect the appeal of Islam.

Since Fatimid Ismailism pushed for an extreme divine right policy, with their succession disputes resulting in religious schisms (Mustali Vs Nizari). But in spite of that, they managed to spread their faith quite widely such as the conversion of Hindu Gujaratis and creation of the Bohra community.
And the Byzantine emperors who were the heads of the Orthodox church managed to spread their faith to the Slavs.

And there are a few million Muslims by this point, most of them have no connection to the government.



Rather the greater religious unity afforded by lack of the Sunni-Shia split would reduce internal religious argumentation, allowing for more focus on Dawah/proselytising.
And a religion with many sects can be off putting, due to difficulty of choosing which one to follow, the lack of this ITTL would make it more appealing.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

OTL, in early Islam, religious beliefs were very decentralised, with individual scholars of diverse social backgrounds (many being freed slaves) influencing Islamic thought. Not the state/Caliphs.

The first and only major attempt to impose a belief by the government was the Mutazila inquisition (Mihna), to try and allow the Caliph himself to interpret Islamic law, without need of the scholars. But it was only accepted by the elites largely to show loyalty to the regime.
With the masses and the sidelined elites (the Khurasanis of Baghdad [Abna] who had been dropped by Mutasim in favour of Turkic slaves) vehemently opposing the inquisition.
And the vastness of the Abbasid realm meant that they were only able to enforce it in the capital Baghdad/Samarra. With Samanids, Aghlabids and other provincial governors being anti-mutazila.

But ITTL, the Alids have a much larger support base than alMutasim. So the increasing of the sanctity/holiness of the Caliphal office would probably be widely accepted.
But if the Caliph tries to enforce his personal interpretation of the Qur'an, and downplay the role of Hadeeth, the Sunni majority would riot.
The Anti-Alid Syrian armies, though defeated are still formidable, supporting the Sunnis similar to how the Abna did during the Mihna.
Similarly, the Berber half of the Caliphate would still have significant khariji tendencies, specifically egalitarianism, opposing the enforcement of the Caliph's religious opinions.
This would probably even stir discontent among other Alids, such as Jafar ibn Abi Talib who taught both Abu Hanifa and Malik.

So I think it wouldn't be pushed that far, leaving it to the scholars.

What's interesting about this is that you could make the case that it was that very power play by the Abbasids (ie Mutazilism) that actually ended up destroying the actual authority of the Caliph in the Muslim world, leading to the fracturing of authority in the realm (only further exacerbated by the Sunni-Shia split) that ended the Islamic Golden Age. If you happen to take that perspective, it's not too hard to see how the Alids could botch things up similar to how the Abbasids eventually did OTL, and notably earlier; though I suppose it may also be possible for them to avoid such a blunder.

But I don't think the Caliph pushing a more divine right policy would affect the appeal of Islam.

Since Fatimid Ismailism pushed for an extreme divine right policy, with their succession disputes resulting in religious schisms (Mustali Vs Nizari). But in spite of that, they managed to spread their faith quite widely such as the conversion of Hindu Gujaratis and creation of the Bohra community.
And the Byzantine emperors who were the heads of the Orthodox church managed to spread their faith to the Slavs.

And there are a few million Muslims by this point, most of them have no connection to the government.

Rather the greater religious unity afforded by lack of the Sunni-Shia split would reduce internal religious argumentation, allowing for more focus on Dawah/proselytising.
And a religion with many sects can be off putting, due to difficulty of choosing which one to follow, the lack of this ITTL would make it more appealing.

That's a very good point too.