(Russian troops during the Budyonnovsk hostage crisis)
The Russian government rejected demands from the Chechen jihadists; nevertheless, for three days, negotiations with the terrorists were conducted in order to ensure the safety of the hostages. Unfortunately, on the third day of the hostage crisis, the terrorists killed five hostages when the reporters did not arrive at the hospital. The New York Times quoted the hospital's chief doctor as saying that "several of the Chechens had just grabbed five hostages at random and shot them to show the world they were serious in their demands that Russian troops leave their land. After this, President Fyodorov ordered the security forces to retake the hospital compound. The forces employed were MVD police ("militsiya") and Internal Troops, along with spetsnaz (special forces) from the Federal Security Service (FSB), including the elite Alpha Group. The strike force attacked the hospital compound at dawn on the fourth day, meeting fierce resistance. After several hours of fighting in which many hostages were killed by crossfire, a local ceasefire was agreed on and 227 hostages were released; 61 others were freed by the Russian troops. A second Russian attack on the hospital a few hours later also failed. The third and final attack by the Russian troops succeeded in retaking the hospital compound and killing all the terrorists, although the Chechens were using hostages as human shields, which resulted in around 300 hostages being killed. The terrorist attack was condemned by the international community; nevertheless, the raid scared the Russian public of the possibility of other terrorist attacks in Russia in the future, which turned out to be true later.
Operation Deliberate Force was strongly condemned by the Russian government as an unlawful and unjustified action by the United States and NATO. The West was informed that Russia would no longer stay idle and observe the Western attacks against the Serbs. Furthermore, the Russian government threatened the West with official diplomatic recognition of the Republika Srpska if further attacks against Serbian forces in Bosnia occurred. While the negotiations between Russia and the West over the future of Bosnia were underway, Russia sent numerous pieces of equipment and volunteers to Serbia. Finally,
the Dayton Agreement was signed, which was a peace agreement that was reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, finalised on 21 November 1995, and formally signed in Paris, on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the three-and-a-half-year-long Bosnian War, which was part of the much larger Yugoslav Wars. The warring parties agreed to peace and to a single neutral state known as
Confederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina composed of two parts, the largely Serb-populated Republika Srpska and the mainly Croat-Bosniak-populated Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
(Thanks to the reform, Russian agricultural sector would boost output in the coming decades)
In the meantime,
the reform of the agricultural sector was introduced in Russia and comprised the following points:
- establishment of a Federal Agricultural Fund tasked with subsidizing and modernizing the agricultural sector in Russia;
- development and expansion of domestic fertilizers' production capabilities;
- increased mechanization;
- more funds dedicated to agricultural education;
- expansion and modernization of greenhouses across Russia;
- increased state investments in the cattle industry.
(Cover of the Russian edition of
Foundations of Geopolitics)
The Foundations of Geopolitics: The Geopolitical Future of Russia published by a far-right philosopher
Aleksand Dugin, was the one most important publications in Russia in the 1990s, as Dugin's publication had a significant influence within the Russian military, police, and foreign policy elites, and and has been used as a textbook in the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian military. Powerful Russian political figures subsequently took an interest in Dugin, a Russian political analyst who espouses an ultranationalist and neo-fascist ideology based on his idea of neo-Eurasianism, who has developed a close relationship with Russia's Academy of the General Staff.
Dugin was born in Moscow, into the family of a colonel-general in the GRU, a Soviet military intelligence agency, and candidate of law, Geliy Aleksandrovich Dugin, and his wife Galina, a doctor and candidate of medicine. His father left the family when he was three, but ensured that they had a good standard of living, and helped Dugin out of trouble with the authorities on occasion. He was transferred to the customs service due to his son's behaviour in 1983. In 1979, Aleksandr entered the Moscow Aviation Institute. He was expelled without a degree either because of low academic achievement, dissident activities or both. Afterwards, he began working as a street cleaner. He used a forged reader's card to access the Lenin Library and continue studying. However, other sources claim he instead started working in a KGB archive, where he had access to banned literature on Masonry, fascism, and paganism. In 1980, Dugin joined the "Yuzhinsky circle", an avant-garde dissident group which dabbled in Satanism, esoteric Nazism and other forms of the occult. In the group, he was known for his embrace of Nazism which he attributes to a rebellion against his Soviet raising, as opposed to genuine sympathy for Hitler. He adopted an alter ego with the name of "ans Sievers", a reference to Wolfram Sievers, a Nazi researcher of the paranormal. Studying by himself, he learned to speak Italian, German, French, English, and Spanish. He was influenced by René Guénon and by the Traditionalist School. In the Lenin Library, he discovered the writings of Julius Evola, whose book Pagan Imperialism he translated into Russian.
In the 1980s, Dugin was a dissident and an anti-communist. Dugin worked as a journalist before becoming involved in politics just before the fall of communism. In 1988, he and his friend Geydar Dzhemal joined the ultranationalist and antisemitic group Pamyat (Memory), which would later give rise to Russian fascism. For a brief period at the beginning of the 1990s he was close to Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the newly formed Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and probably had a role in formulating its nationalist communist ideology. In 1993 he co-founded, together with Eduard Limonov, the National Bolshevik Party, whose nationalistic interpretation of Bolshevism was based on the ideas of Ernst Niekisch. Dugin published
Foundations of Geopolitics in 1996. The book was published in multiple editions, and is used in university courses on geopolitics, reportedly including the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian military. It alarmed political scientists in the US, and is sometimes referenced by them as being
"Russia's Manifest Destiny". Dugin credited General Nikolai Klokotov of the Academy of the General Staff as co-author and his main inspiration, though Klokotov denies this. Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, head of the International Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence, helped draft the book. Klokotov stated that in the future the book would "serve as a mighty ideological foundation for preparing a new military command". Dugin has asserted that the book has been adopted as a textbook in many Russian educational institutions. Gennadiy Seleznyov, for whom Dugin was adviser on geopolitics,"urged that Dugin's geopolitical doctrine be made a compulsory part of the school curriculum".
(Dugin as an far-right political philosopher would play a very important role in the coming decades in Russia)
Dugin's publication brought the renaissance of
Eurasianism, which was socio-political movement in Russia that emerged in the early 20th century which states that Russia does not belong in the "European" or "Asian" categories but instead to the geopolitical concept of Eurasia governed by the
"Russian world" forming an ostensibly standalone Russian civilization. The roots of Eurasianism lie in Russia’s Bolshevik Revolution, although many of the ideas that it contains have much longer histories in Russia. After the 1917 October Revolution and the civil war that followed, two million anti-Bolshevik Russians fled the country. From Sofia to Berlin and then Paris, some of these exiled Russian intellectuals worked to create an alternative to the Bolshevik project. One of those alternatives eventually became the Eurasianist ideology. Proponents of this idea posited that Russia’s Westernizers and Bolsheviks were both wrong: Westernizers for believing that Russia was a (lagging) part of European civilization and calling for democratic development; Bolsheviks for presuming that the whole country needed restructuring through class confrontation and a global revolution of the working class. Rather, Eurasianists stressed, Russia was a unique civilization with its own path and historical mission: To create a different center of power and culture that would be neither European nor Asian but have traits of both. Eurasianists believed in the eventual downfall of the West and that it was Russia’s time to be the world’s prime exemplar.
In 1921, the exiled thinkers Georges Florovsky, Nikolai Trubetzkoy, Petr Savitskii, and Petr Suvchinsky published a collection of articles titled
Exodus to the East, which marked the official birth of the Eurasianist ideology. The book was centered on the idea that Russia’s geography is its fate and that there is nothing any ruler can do to unbind himself from the necessities of securing his lands. Given Russia’s vastness, they believed, its leaders must think imperially, consuming and assimilating dangerous populations on every border. Meanwhile, they regarded any form of democracy, open economy, local governance, or secular freedom as highly dangerous and unacceptable. In that sense, Eurasianists considered Peter the Great - who tried to Europeanize Russia in the eighteenth century - an enemy and a traitor. Instead, they looked with favor on Tatar-Mongol rule, between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, when Genghis Khan’s empire had taught Russians crucial lessons about building a strong, centralized state and pyramid-like system of submission and control.
Eurasianist beliefs gained a strong following within the politically active part of the emigrant community, or White Russians, who were eager to promote any alternative to Bolshevism. However, the philosophy was utterly ignored, and even suppressed in the Soviet Union, and it practically died with its creators. That is, until the 1990s, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia’s ideological slate was wiped clean. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ultranationalist ideologies were decidedly out of vogue. Rather, most Russians looked forward to Russia’s democratization and reintegration with the world. Still, a few hard-core patriotic elements remained that opposed de-Sovietization and believed - that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. Among them was the ideologist Alexander Dugin, who was a regular contributor to the ultranationalist analytic center and newspaper
Den’ (later known as
Zavtra). His earliest claim to fame was a 1991 pamphlet, “The War of the Continents,” in which he described an ongoing geopolitical struggle between the two types of global powers: land powers, or “Eternal Rome,” which are based on the principles of statehood, communality, idealism, and the superiority of the common good, and civilizations of the sea, or “Eternal Carthage,” which are based on individualism, trade, and materialism. In Dugin’s understanding, “Eternal Carthage,” was historically embodied by Athenian democracy and the Dutch and British Empires. Now, it is represented by the United States. “Eternal Rome” is embodied by Russia. For Dugin, the conflict between the two will last until one is destroyed completely - no type of political regime and no amount of trade can stop that. In order for the “good” (Russia) to eventually defeat the “bad” (United States), he wrote, a conservative revolution must take place.
Dugin's ideas of conservative revolution were adapted from German interwar thinkers who promoted the destruction of the individualistic liberal order and the commercial culture of industrial and urban civilization in favor of a new order based on conservative values such as the submission of individual needs and desires to the needs of the many, a state-organized economy, and traditional values for society based on a quasi-religious view of the world. For Dugin, the prime example of a conservative revolution was the radical, Nazi-sponsored north Italian Social Republic of Salò (1943–45). Indeed, Dugin continuously returned to what he saw as the virtues of Nazi practices and voiced appreciation for the SS and Herman Wirth’s occult Ahnenerbe group. In particular, Dugin praised the orthodox conservative-revolutionary projects that the SS and Ahnenerbe developed for postwar Europe, in which they envisioned a new, unified Europe regulated by a feudal system of ethnically separated regions that would serve as vassals to the German suzerain. It is worth noting that, among other projects, the Ahnenerbe was responsible for all the experiments on humans in the Auschwitz and Dachau concentration camps.
In
Foundations of Geopolitics, Dugin made a distinction between "Atlantic" and "Eurasian" societies, which means, as Benjamin R. Teitelbaum describes it "between societies whose coastal geographical position made them cosmopolitan and landlocked societies oriented toward preservation and cohesion". Dugin calls for the "Atlantic societies", primarily represented by the United States, to lose their broader geopolitical influence in Eurasia, and for Russia to rebuild its influence through annexations and alliances. The book declares that "the battle for the world rule of Russians" has not ended and Russia remains "the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution". The Eurasian Empire will be constructed "on the fundamental principle of the common enemy: the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the U.S., and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us."Interestingly, it seems he does not rule out the possibility of Russia joining and/or even supporting EU and NATO instrumentally in a pragmatic way of further Western subversion against geopolitical "Americanism". Military operations play a relatively minor role except for the military intelligence operations he calls "special military operations". The textbook advocates a sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services. The operations should be assisted by a tough, hard-headed utilization of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resources to bully and pressure other countries. The book states that "the maximum task [of the future] is the 'Finlandization' of all of Europe". Following success of his publication, Dugin began working as official adviser to new Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov and Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Sobchak. Furthermore, Dugin became the head of the Department of Sociology of International Relations at Moscow State University.
(The Siege of Kizlyar resulted in 900 hostage deaths)
The Kizlyar hostage crisis, also known in Russia as the terrorist act in Kizlyar, occurred in January 1996. What began as a raid by Chechen jihadists forces led by Salman Raduyev against a federal military airbase near Kizlyar, Dagestan, became a hostage crisis involving thousands of civilians. It culminated in a battle between the Chechens and Russian special forces in the city of Kizlyar, which was destroyed by Russian artillery fire. During the battle, at least 960 hostages and more than 350 combatants on both sides died. On January 9, 1996, a force of about 200 Chechen jihadists led by Salman Raduyev, calling themselves Lone Wolf launched a raid similar to the one triggering the Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis. The city of Kizlyar in the neighbouring republic of Dagestan, the site of the first Imperial Russian fort in the region (and many historical battles), was chosen as the target due to its proximity and easy access of 3 kilometres (2 mi) from the Chechen border across flat terrain. The guerrillas began the raid with a nighttime assault on a military airbase outside Kizlyar, where they destroyed at least two helicopters and killed 33 servicemen, before withdrawing.
At 6 am, pursued by Russian reinforcements, the withdrawing Chechen terrorists entered the town itself and took hostage an estimated 2,000 to 3,400 people (according to official Russian accounts, there were "no more than 1,200" hostages taken). The hostages were rounded up in multiple locations and taken to the occupied city hospital and a nearby high-rise building. Field commander Khunkar-Pasha Israpilov later said that he took command of the operation from Raduyev after the latter failed in his mission to destroy the airbase, an ammunition factory and other military and police installations in and around the city. At least 46 people died on January 9. Although on January 12 the rebels freed the women and children, they said they would release the male hostages only if four Russian officials took their places. The Chechens installed most of the hostages in the city school and the mosque and set up defensive positions, putting the captured policemen and some civilian hostages to work digging trenches. Over the next three days Russian special-forces detachments from a number of services, numbering about 500 and supported by tanks, armored vehicles and attack helicopters, repeatedly tried to penetrate the city but they were beaten back with heavy losses, including at least 12 killed. Among the dead was the commander of Moscow special police force SOBR, Andrei Krestyaninov; surviving commandos described the fighting as "hell".
(Chechen jihadist with bodies of Russian troops during the Siege of Kizlyar)
After the assault attempts failed, Russian commanders then ordered their forces to open fire on the city with mortars, howitzers and rocket launchers. American correspondent Michael Specter reported that the Russians were "firing into Kizlyar at the rate of one a minute – the same Grad missiles they used to largely destroy the Chechen capital Grozny when the conflict began." Specter noted: "The Grads fell with monstrous concussive force throughout the day. In this town, about 6 kilometres (4 mi) away, where journalists have been herded by Russian forces, windows cracked at the force of the repeated blasts ... Mikhailov said today that he was adding up the Chechen casualties, not by number of corpses, 'but by the number of arms and legs.'"[Barsukov later joked that "the usage of the Grad multiple rocket launchers was mainly psychological", and CNN reported that "the general's answers were openly mocking." Among Russian troops deployed to the city was an FSB agent from Nalchik, Alexander Litvinenko, whose ad-hoc squad came under friendly fire from Grad rockets. Heavy losses (including friendly-fire incidents) triggered a collapse in morale among the Russian forces. Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer reported that "based on information from observers and participants of the fighting, it can be concluded that Interior Ministry officers were on the verge of mutiny." It was reported that demoralized, cold and hungry Russian troops begged the locals for alcohol and cigarettes in exchange for ammunition.
A large group of relatives of the hostages gathered near security checkpoints 10 kilometres (6.2 mi) from the city and silently watched the bombardment. Russian authorities tried to minimize coverage of the crisis by blocking access to the scene with guard dogs, turning journalists away with warning shots and confiscating their equipment. The dogs injured several journalists (including an ABC cameraman and a correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor), and a reporter's car was fired on at a military checkpoint after being permitted to cross. Russian forces turned away relief workers, including representatives of Doctors Without Borders and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Reporters Without Borders protested Russian intimidation of the press in Pervomayskoye, its ban of medical assistance to civilians and its refusal to permit evacuation of the wounded.
(Spetznaz troops during the Siege of Kizlyar)
The Siege of Kizlyar resulted in 150 Russian, 200 Chechen and 900 hostages dead. The Russian government reacted hawkishly to the "liberation of Kizlyar"; Fyodorov initially said that "all the bandits have been destroyed, unless there are some still hiding underground", the operation was "planned and carried out correctly" and "is over with a minimum of losses to the hostages and our own people." One of top Russian officials said, "It is clear to everyone that it is pointless to talk to these people [Chechen jihadists]. They are not the kind of people you can negotiate with." U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry affirmed solidarity with Fyodorov's government, saying that Russia was justified in using military force in response to hostage-taking. The operation triggered outrage in Dagestan and across Russia, especially in liberal circles. Prime Minister Grigory Yavlinsky criticized President Fyodorov and the Russian Military and said, "It is time to face the fact that we are in a real civil war now in Russia. This was not a hostage crisis. It is a hopeless war, even though it was started by us". Fyodorov's human-rights commissioner, resigned from all his posts in protest of the "cruel punitive action" and Boris Yeltsin drafted a letter calling on Fyodorov not to run in the upcoming presidential elections. In a January 19 Interfax poll, 75 percent of respondents in Moscow and Saint Petersburg thought that all the "power ministers" should resign.
The incident's handling was widely criticized by Russian and foreign journalists, humanitarian organizations and human-rights groups. Russian press accounts (including an account from Izvestia correspondent Valery Yakov, who witnessed the fighting from inside the city) described a chaotic, overmanned and bungled Russian operation in Kizlyar; Pavel Felgenhauer wrote that the armed services involved in the assault displayed a "fantastic lack of coordination." An opinion piece in The New York Times said, "All this bloodshed and confusion was dressed up in Moscow with Soviet-style propaganda, including false claims about minimal Russian losses and the elimination of enemy forces. The use of force against terrorism should be commensurate with the threat and employed in a way that limits the loss of life. Military action should be accompanied by full disclosure of information about the conflict and casualties. The murderous assault on Kizlyar did not meet any of those tests."
(Igor Ivanov - new conservative Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation)
The Ivanov doctrine was a Russian political doctrine formulated in the 1990s. It assumes that the national security of Russia relies on its superpower status and therefore Russia cannot allow the formation of a unipolar international order led by the United States. The doctrine takes its name from Igor Ivanov, who was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation by President Svyatoslav Fyodorov in 1996. Ivanov led the efforts to redirect the foreign policy of Russia away from the West by advocating the formation of a strategic trilateral alliance of Russia, China and India to create a counterbalance to the United States in Eurasia. The Ivanov doctrine revolved around five key ideas: Firstly, Russia is viewed as an indispensable actor who pursues an independent foreign policy; Secondly, Russia ought to pursue a multipolar world managed by a concert of major powers; Thirdly, Russia ought to pursue supremacy in the former Soviet sphere of influence and should pursue Eurasian integration; Fourthly, Russia ought to oppose NATO expansion; Fifthly, Russia should pursue a partnership with China. The doctrine led to the gestation of a Russia, India and China trilateral format, which would eventually become the BRICS.
Alone among the major combatants in World War II, Japan and Russia had yet to sign a peace treaty, fully normalizing their relations. The immediate cause of this anomalous situation was the inability of Tokyo and Moscow to agree on the ownership of the Kurile Islands, which the Soviet Union seized and annexed in the closing days of the war. The Soviets adopted the position maintained by their Russian successors—that they did this in agreement with their then ally, the United States, at the February 1945 Yalta Conference, the decisions of which Japan later accepted. In the Russian view, Japan consequently had no basis for disputing Russian sovereignty over the islands. The Japanese, however, argued that even though they ceded the Kuriles in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, these do not include the four southernmost islands—Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai—which are an extension of nearby Hokkaido and hence part of Japan. Tokyo therefore insisted that these Northern Territories were illegally occupied by Russia and must be returned. The United States supported Japan’s position, but it did not begin to do so until the 1950s, when the intensification of the Cold War made it necessary to bolster Japanese support for the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The Northern Territories issue, as the Japanese called it, was not the only intractable territorial dispute in East Asia, nor was it a particularly explosive one in terms of its potential to spark conflict. The Japanese government had never been willing or able to contest the Russian occupation of the islands by force or the threat of force. It had instead kept the issue at the forefront of its bilateral dealings with Moscow, steadfastly maintaining its claim to the islands and insisting on their return as the sine qua non of a peace treaty and improved relations. A settlement held attractions for both sides. For the Japanese, it would write finis to what they see as the most humiliating legacy of World War II—foreign occupation of part of their national territory. In the view of many, a settlement would also facilitate their access to the rich natural resources of Siberia and the Russian Far East. For the Russians, improved relations with Japan offers the promise of attracting Japanese capital and technology to develop their eastern territories and integrate them with the dynamic East Asian economic region. Geopolitically, a Russo-Japan rapprochement would strengthen the hand of Moscow and Tokyo in dealing with a “rising China,” and support the Great Power ambitions of their political leaders and elites. While a deal on the Northern Territories might appear to be in the mutual interest of Russia and Japan, none has been forthcoming. During the Cold War, the issue was framed by Soviet-American rivalry in which Japan was a subordinate player. Stalin refused to discuss the status of the islands but Khrushchev, hoping to weaken the Japanese-American alliance, offered to return the two smallest ones (Shikotan and Habomai) after the conclusion of a peace treaty.
The Japanese were tempted, but Washington torpedoed the deal before it could be struck, and Khrushchev withdrew his offer in 1960. The one positive legacy of this episode was the reestablishment of diplomatic ties between Moscow and Tokyo in 1956. Until the late 1980s, however, Soviet-Japanese relations remained frozen. The Soviets dismissed Japan as an American client state and were contemptuous of its lack of military power and political clout in the international arena. Some Soviet observers were impressed by Japan’s economic growth and potential to contribute to Siberia’s development. But the Soviet leadership was indifferent to this potential and presented an inflexible face to Tokyo, denying that a territorial dispute even existed. Japan’s conservative leaders, for their part, reverted to the position that the return of all four islands was the precondition for a peace treaty and any improvement in relations. Soviet intransigence and belligerence were not entirely unwelcome to conservative Japanese leaders insofar as they provided a rationale for the American alliance and the buildup of the Self Defense Forces.
Soviet-Japanese relations became even frostier in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a result of Moscow’s displeasure with Japan’s endorsement of China’s stand against Soviet “hegemonism,” and Japanese alarm over the expansion of the Soviet Pacific fleet. Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-87) seized on the enhanced Soviet threat to strengthen military cooperation with the United States and assert Japan’s identity as a Great Power. The advent of Gorbachev marked a sea change in Soviet-Japanese relations. Intrigued by the possibility of using Japan to develop the stagnant and backward economy of the Soviet Far East, Gorbachev signaled flexibility by acknowledging the disputed status of the Northern Territories (or “South Kuriles” as the Soviets called them) and offering to negotiate a settlement. But while Tokyo welcomed this overture, it was suspicious of Gorbachev’s intentions and skeptical of his willingness to deliver substantive concessions. The Japanese consequently stuck to their Cold War position that a peace treaty and large scale Japanese economic assistance would depend on Soviet agreement to return the four disputed islands. This, however, was too much for Moscow hardliners to swallow and it fell to Gorbachev’s Russian successor, President Fyodorov, to try to cut a deal with Tokyo. Fyodorov was no less interested in attracting Japanese aid and investment, but Japan’s insistence on prior territorial concessions continued to pose a stumbling block inasmuch as such concessions were perceived by Russian nationalists as a humiliating surrender to foreign pressure and blandishments. Fyodorov, his hands tied by domestic resistance, could offer little more than a declaration of his intention to resolve the Northern Territories issue, and negotiations petered out in deadlock in the early 1990s. Stymied in his attempt to achieve a breakthrough with Japan, Fyodorov shifted his focus to developing a “strategic partnership” with China based in part on their common opposition to perceived U.S. “hegemonism.”