I concur on this. Patagonia from what I imagine, is very sparsely populated compared to Texas. So I don't believe such a parallel could possibly exist.
Sequel de Mayo (Cinco de Mayo, Vol. II)
- Thread starter KingSweden24
- Start date
I'm not sure how it compares to say Australia.
And would control by Chile lead to more or less population growth in the area? I'm actually thinking less. But iOTL, the heavy immigration was post WWI, so I'm thinking somewhat equivalent from the CEW, and lots of sheep farming (as iOTL).
Tounens' kingdom of Araucania and Patagonia in the 1860s comes to mind.
So, if my memory is right, though you can check online...
Set up by native Mapuche tribes who offered the crown to a French adventurer in hope of getting foreign support. The story ended when Chileans invaded and captured or kidnapped, according to whomever is telling it, King Antoine, declaring him insane and committing him to an asylum, before expelling him.
The funny thing is there are still claimants to the throne of this ephemeral kingdom to this day iotl.
Now, with Chile in the middle of a civil war ITTL, one may wonder what the pretender, probably living somewhere in France, would be up to, or closer to home, what the Mapuches might think they could do...
Just if you need to spice up the Chilean civil war with another complication.
So, if my memory is right, though you can check online...
Set up by native Mapuche tribes who offered the crown to a French adventurer in hope of getting foreign support. The story ended when Chileans invaded and captured or kidnapped, according to whomever is telling it, King Antoine, declaring him insane and committing him to an asylum, before expelling him.
The funny thing is there are still claimants to the throne of this ephemeral kingdom to this day iotl.
Now, with Chile in the middle of a civil war ITTL, one may wonder what the pretender, probably living somewhere in France, would be up to, or closer to home, what the Mapuches might think they could do...
Just if you need to spice up the Chilean civil war with another complication.
Thinking about the Territory of Arizona, I think we all agree the Americans are grabbing it in the peace treaty. However a few oddball possibilities both at this point and possible changes before this.
Found the following in the description of part of the Southwest Campaign. (https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/cinco-de-mayo.469198/page-472#post-23971989)
"By late April, the Americans were back at the gates of Los Pasos again, but the force under Gerhardt was larger, better equipped, and more experienced than the novice conscripts Pershing had been saddled with the previous spring, despite all his gallantry, and the logistics network of the southwestern desert was now fully in American hands, despite frequent Confederate and Mormon sabotage."
Since this describes Mormon sabotage as separate from Confederate sabotage, it makes me wonder what areas are heavily (Fundamentalist) LDS that are doing this. We also had a mention of Railroad sabotage being a possibility on the trip back from San Diego after the peace treaty with the Mexicans. Really makes you wonder how we *didn't* end up with this iOTL. Oddly this may be one of the areas where the TL *most* resembles TL-191.
I *hope* that by 1920 in the TL (yes, I know after the CEW), we get a better feelings for the current situation in regards to the FLDS.
- Would it have made any difference either before the war or in these negotiations if Arizona had become a confederate State in say 1908?
- Would there be any way that the Arizona Territory could have tried to join the RoT, figuring they were getting even more ignored by Richmond?
- I there any way that the Peace treaty could leave Arizona Confederate? That would leave the land virtually ungovernable by Richmond, but would sure be an interesting place to write about.
- Could they have declared themselves (whatever was left of the Arizonan territorial government) as the Republic of Arizona during 1916? They would have had even less problems giving up Slavery than Texas.
Found the following in the description of part of the Southwest Campaign. (https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/cinco-de-mayo.469198/page-472#post-23971989)
"By late April, the Americans were back at the gates of Los Pasos again, but the force under Gerhardt was larger, better equipped, and more experienced than the novice conscripts Pershing had been saddled with the previous spring, despite all his gallantry, and the logistics network of the southwestern desert was now fully in American hands, despite frequent Confederate and Mormon sabotage."
Since this describes Mormon sabotage as separate from Confederate sabotage, it makes me wonder what areas are heavily (Fundamentalist) LDS that are doing this. We also had a mention of Railroad sabotage being a possibility on the trip back from San Diego after the peace treaty with the Mexicans. Really makes you wonder how we *didn't* end up with this iOTL. Oddly this may be one of the areas where the TL *most* resembles TL-191.
I *hope* that by 1920 in the TL (yes, I know after the CEW), we get a better feelings for the current situation in regards to the FLDS.
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The pretender for Araucania in 1917 would be that guy:
en.m.wikipedia.org
Jacques Antoine Bernard - Wikipedia
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89. Athenians. For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences--either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us--and make a long speech which would not be believed; and in return we hope that you, instead of thinking to influence us by saying that you did not join the Lacedaemonians, although their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both; since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Fake Spoiler.
The title of the book "The Root of the Problem: The Tumultuous Term of America's 29th President" comes from the fact that Root is shot in the head at the Mt. Vernon Conference by a Confederate Red Scarf and lingers on (without having regained conciousness) until after the date he should have been sworn in and dies in Mid-March (two weeks afterwards) The resulting question of who is running the US during this time period leads to TTLs equivalent of the OTL 25th amendment regarding Presidential Succession. The only reason that this did not lead to a significantly different Treaty of Mount Vernon is that the Red Scarf killed CSA President Patton first.
The title of the book "The Root of the Problem: The Tumultuous Term of America's 29th President" comes from the fact that Root is shot in the head at the Mt. Vernon Conference by a Confederate Red Scarf and lingers on (without having regained conciousness) until after the date he should have been sworn in and dies in Mid-March (two weeks afterwards) The resulting question of who is running the US during this time period leads to TTLs equivalent of the OTL 25th amendment regarding Presidential Succession. The only reason that this did not lead to a significantly different Treaty of Mount Vernon is that the Red Scarf killed CSA President Patton first.
Mount Vernon Congress (Part II)
"...no question that there was a limit against which the United States could push at which Patton, Martin, and McReynolds would storm out of the room, even if that would threaten the war to start up again. It was for this reason that Stimson had advised against anything other than a demobilization of rotating back the most experienced and thus fatigued men to be replaced with the latest training cadres and lowering the number of recruits and conscripts being brought through the system; already, Stimson had begun working closely with an utterly spent Bliss to retool the US Army into an occupation force, as the wily Secretary of War strongly doubted that the Confederacy would "act honorably, as they have never before" in terms of accepting the terms of a treaty.
The Confederate Army was allowed a standing army of twenty-five thousand men, or two divisions, with a division held in reserve; it was forbidden from deploying horse or armored cavalry, and was allowed ten airplanes and sixteen scouting balloons that were to remain unarmed at all time. The state militias were to be capped at five thousand men apiece, with similar equipment restrictions, and the Confederate government would agree in the clauses of the final treaty to ban the deployment of said militias outside of their home states. The Confederate Navy was permitted an equivalent tonnage of two cruisers, total, in essence forcing them to deploy a patrol fleet of cutters along their coastlines rather than anything substantive, and Confederate naval vessels were not allowed to pass north of a line from the mouth of the York River to Cape Charles, thus keeping the Chesapeake in essence an American lake with a shared mouth. The Confederacy was also to ban conscription and make their military services entirely professional and all-volunteer, a novel clause, but one meant to avoid mass mobilization in the future.
This arguably solved the least thorny issue of the peace, guaranteeing that the Confederacy could pose no threat militarily in the future and reducing the danger of a threat to an expected American occupation, which was the next piece pursued by Root, Lodge and Turner. The Confederacy was to allow the military occupation of "ports, railyards and areas of strategic value" to "ensure the execution of the terms of any final agreement;" this meant that cities that had never fallen into American hands, such as New Orleans, were to be opened and Yankee soldiers allowed in to occupy. The operation of the Confederate rail system was handed over in its entirety to the United States Army, and civilian officialdom in the Confederacy was to "cooperate and obey military directives in such cases as civil authority and the United States Army would otherwise conflict;" while the whole of the country was not being divided up into military districts, it may as well have been, and the continuation of constitutional rule of law in much of the Confederacy was window dressing (and, as it was quickly seen, difficult to enforce in fact)..."
- Making Sense of the Senseless: The Great American War at 100
"...Turner proved unhappy with due to the dependence of his party on states with strong resource extraction economies in the Mine Belt, but the economic provisions of the final treaty were non-negotiable to Lodge especially, and Chelwood provided important aid in finding a compromise position between the two Senators that both could live with. The Confederacy was not to set any tariffs upon the United States, either generally or specific to any good or industry, for a period of fifty years, after which they would be permitted to levy a tariff of five percent on raw goods for the next twenty and a tariff of ten percent on raw goods in perpetuity thereafter, but "finished and industrial goods" were to remain forever exempt. The Confederacy was also not to set any export duties - a popular method of financing its government - on raw goods to the United States under the same terms. Root was highly skeptical of the sunset clause, finding them uncomfortably similar to the Treaty of Havana's sunsets that had sparked the entire conflict in the first place, but was swayed by Turner that the circumstances were entirely different.
And regarding the Mississippi, indeed they were. The Confederacy was to make "the whole of the river and its drainage (emphasis ours) available for the commercial use of the United States irrevocably and without physical interdiction, molestation by way of tariff, or interruption of the free flow of trade in any riverine port." Regarding New Orleans, the Confederacy "was to levy no duty on passage out of the city or import into this Continent" on "any vessel registered and flagged as part of the United States," and the United States was also to be granted a foreign concession within New Orleans modeled upon the concessions in Asia, with an "area of 45 hectares to be reserved for the use of the United States customs authority, for banks of the United States, and citizens thereof." The plain language of these provisions meant that the United States would be able to, for the first time, collect tariffs on imports at the point of New Orleans and thereafter treat the whole Mississippi Basin as a zone of free trade on which no additional costs could be levied, dramatically reducing the risk of a trade war such as what triggered the crises of 1913.
Finally, in terms of penalties for the Confederacy, the financial indemnity was more or less ruinous. McReynolds chafed badly at the "war guilt clause" and spent much of the Congress doing whatever he could to avoid it carrying teeth, which both failed as Lodge simply delayed drafting the clauses for it and it created a bevy of concessions by Patton to evade its inclusion, and these were economic. The Confederacy was to pay a total indemnity of 15 million dollars in gold, silver or other "hard assets" per annum by 1927, and was also to pay a five hundred thousand dollar indemnity annually by a method of its choosing for the next twenty-five years, at a rate of ten percent interest. American occupation of Confederate ports was to continue until 1927 when the "grand indemnity" was paid, and the United States would reserve the right to re-occupy Confederate ports anytime thereafter should the "little indemnity" be defaulted upon. These provisions would serve to effectively cripple the Confederacy economically for over a generation, as it was already deeply indebted with much of its potential collateral destroyed; even Chelwood thought this maneuver was excessive, but Root insisted, in part to help pay down some of Philadelphia's own postwar debt.
As such, the draft treaty's first twelve chapters covered the military limits, armament restrictions, and economic guarantees by the Confederacy, all of which were remarkably harsh but which Patton and his coterie begrudgingly swallowed even as they started looking for ways to work around them almost as soon as they left Mount Vernon. The difficult measures, the ones sure to stir ill will and threaten to blow up the treaty, were yet to come on extremely emotive matters - Confederate territory, and the fate of the Negro..."
- The Root of the Problem: The Tumultuous Term of America's 29th President
The Confederate Army was allowed a standing army of twenty-five thousand men, or two divisions, with a division held in reserve; it was forbidden from deploying horse or armored cavalry, and was allowed ten airplanes and sixteen scouting balloons that were to remain unarmed at all time. The state militias were to be capped at five thousand men apiece, with similar equipment restrictions, and the Confederate government would agree in the clauses of the final treaty to ban the deployment of said militias outside of their home states. The Confederate Navy was permitted an equivalent tonnage of two cruisers, total, in essence forcing them to deploy a patrol fleet of cutters along their coastlines rather than anything substantive, and Confederate naval vessels were not allowed to pass north of a line from the mouth of the York River to Cape Charles, thus keeping the Chesapeake in essence an American lake with a shared mouth. The Confederacy was also to ban conscription and make their military services entirely professional and all-volunteer, a novel clause, but one meant to avoid mass mobilization in the future.
This arguably solved the least thorny issue of the peace, guaranteeing that the Confederacy could pose no threat militarily in the future and reducing the danger of a threat to an expected American occupation, which was the next piece pursued by Root, Lodge and Turner. The Confederacy was to allow the military occupation of "ports, railyards and areas of strategic value" to "ensure the execution of the terms of any final agreement;" this meant that cities that had never fallen into American hands, such as New Orleans, were to be opened and Yankee soldiers allowed in to occupy. The operation of the Confederate rail system was handed over in its entirety to the United States Army, and civilian officialdom in the Confederacy was to "cooperate and obey military directives in such cases as civil authority and the United States Army would otherwise conflict;" while the whole of the country was not being divided up into military districts, it may as well have been, and the continuation of constitutional rule of law in much of the Confederacy was window dressing (and, as it was quickly seen, difficult to enforce in fact)..."
- Making Sense of the Senseless: The Great American War at 100
"...Turner proved unhappy with due to the dependence of his party on states with strong resource extraction economies in the Mine Belt, but the economic provisions of the final treaty were non-negotiable to Lodge especially, and Chelwood provided important aid in finding a compromise position between the two Senators that both could live with. The Confederacy was not to set any tariffs upon the United States, either generally or specific to any good or industry, for a period of fifty years, after which they would be permitted to levy a tariff of five percent on raw goods for the next twenty and a tariff of ten percent on raw goods in perpetuity thereafter, but "finished and industrial goods" were to remain forever exempt. The Confederacy was also not to set any export duties - a popular method of financing its government - on raw goods to the United States under the same terms. Root was highly skeptical of the sunset clause, finding them uncomfortably similar to the Treaty of Havana's sunsets that had sparked the entire conflict in the first place, but was swayed by Turner that the circumstances were entirely different.
And regarding the Mississippi, indeed they were. The Confederacy was to make "the whole of the river and its drainage (emphasis ours) available for the commercial use of the United States irrevocably and without physical interdiction, molestation by way of tariff, or interruption of the free flow of trade in any riverine port." Regarding New Orleans, the Confederacy "was to levy no duty on passage out of the city or import into this Continent" on "any vessel registered and flagged as part of the United States," and the United States was also to be granted a foreign concession within New Orleans modeled upon the concessions in Asia, with an "area of 45 hectares to be reserved for the use of the United States customs authority, for banks of the United States, and citizens thereof." The plain language of these provisions meant that the United States would be able to, for the first time, collect tariffs on imports at the point of New Orleans and thereafter treat the whole Mississippi Basin as a zone of free trade on which no additional costs could be levied, dramatically reducing the risk of a trade war such as what triggered the crises of 1913.
Finally, in terms of penalties for the Confederacy, the financial indemnity was more or less ruinous. McReynolds chafed badly at the "war guilt clause" and spent much of the Congress doing whatever he could to avoid it carrying teeth, which both failed as Lodge simply delayed drafting the clauses for it and it created a bevy of concessions by Patton to evade its inclusion, and these were economic. The Confederacy was to pay a total indemnity of 15 million dollars in gold, silver or other "hard assets" per annum by 1927, and was also to pay a five hundred thousand dollar indemnity annually by a method of its choosing for the next twenty-five years, at a rate of ten percent interest. American occupation of Confederate ports was to continue until 1927 when the "grand indemnity" was paid, and the United States would reserve the right to re-occupy Confederate ports anytime thereafter should the "little indemnity" be defaulted upon. These provisions would serve to effectively cripple the Confederacy economically for over a generation, as it was already deeply indebted with much of its potential collateral destroyed; even Chelwood thought this maneuver was excessive, but Root insisted, in part to help pay down some of Philadelphia's own postwar debt.
As such, the draft treaty's first twelve chapters covered the military limits, armament restrictions, and economic guarantees by the Confederacy, all of which were remarkably harsh but which Patton and his coterie begrudgingly swallowed even as they started looking for ways to work around them almost as soon as they left Mount Vernon. The difficult measures, the ones sure to stir ill will and threaten to blow up the treaty, were yet to come on extremely emotive matters - Confederate territory, and the fate of the Negro..."
- The Root of the Problem: The Tumultuous Term of America's 29th President
I wonder what the plan is to tackle Article I Section 9 of the Confederate Constitution, which was fairly explicit in preventing the confederacy from banning slavery. Any attempt to formalize abolition is going to require a constitutional amendment, which to put it mildly will be very interesting given the state of the country immediately post war.
They could do what America did with Japan in OTL and have them replace the original Constitution with a new Postwar Constitution with, among other changes, that section taken out completely.
Jesus Christ these terms make Chile's seem like a slap on the wrist. Couldn't happen to a better group of scumbags and losers.
RIP to any domestic industry, light or heavy. If you are a Confederate silverware maker (it is fresh on my mind because the wife and I are looking to upgrade ours) for example, there's no way your market won't get flooded by cheaper Northern goods. I'm sure there's tons of loopholes and the like but it will be exceedingly hard for small and medium sized shops to operate in the South for decades after.
mortonofski
Donor
Unfortunately, those who advocated for "fuck around" were eaten by one or more ouroboroses (ourobori?), either Tillman's or the Red Scarves', and won't be around for the "find out" stage. Pity, that.
Chelwood: Let's make sure this never happens in Europe.
Europe: Starts the CEW not two years later.
I hold in my hands the world's smallest violin.
I just realized something. America has another potential option regarding a black free state. The sparsely populated and unbearably hot territory of Arizona. I know even Kentucky might be pushing it, but it would be unfortunately plausible to have freemen forced into far less hospitable territory.
I’m far more keen on Kentucky being the buffer state, but Arizona would certainly be interesting to read about.
I’m far more keen on Kentucky being the buffer state, but Arizona would certainly be interesting to read about.
Two ways around this, that I can see.
1) the US is occupying much of the country and can make sure that votes for said amendment progress much as the US sees fit. If the US is basically on hand to 'defend' the state legislatures from violence by pro-Slavery types, me thinks those same legislatures would end up taking the votes thst said defends suggest as prudent.
A bit ham handed, yes, and not really within the boundaries of Democracy the way the US likes to practice it, but so be it.
2) the Confederate Supreme Court rules that foreign treatises supercede the constitution as they are agreements between two governments.
This last one is the more interesting choice, bit would really open up a clusterf@ck for the Confederates in the future. But it MAY mean that abolition is seen as having a bit more legitimacy, oddly enough (hey, at least, a bunch of rotten legislatures weren't forced at gun point to do the deed, after the treaty was already signed).
Either way, the Freedmen are going to be looking towards the US as a benefactor during the occupation and into the future. And I'm sure there's NO WAY that could ever blow up in their face.