WI Mao Dies 1963 (2023 ed)

[John Fredrick Parker]

I came across a mention on-line of Mao having apparently contracted septicaemia due to a poorly treated chest pustule that led to an abscess. Now obviously in our timeline he recovered but what if it had instead developed into a fatal case of sepsis? The timing is interesting as it's between the end of the Great Leap Forward in 1962 and the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

If I'm reading things right then a triumvirate of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaopin would likely be in charge at least initially. They seem to have been a mix of Soviet-style states planners and, as shown later, pragmatists who were willing to look at alternatives. Would the more left-wing elements of the party try to take power, and how might that fare without the Cultural Revolution having happened? Internationally Khrushchev is still in power and I don't think the triumvirate would be able, due to domestic complications, to make a drastic change in the short time period before he was overthrown to improve relations. After Khrushchev's ouster however might it open the door to a reconciliation?

Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man but flawed. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?

-Chen Yun

I should note that the question of whether China’s turn toward Market Reforms were effectively inevitable following the Great Leap Forward, and whether the Cultural Revolution delayed or enhanced this transformation, is a matter of some debate.

Frank Dikotter makes the case, iirc, that the economic catastrophe Mao inaugurated was so spectacular that it effectively broke the government’s ability to centrally run the economy creating a black market so big it effectively was the Chinese economy, and that the eventual capitalist economy that China grew after Mao was built on this underground economy. It is also my understanding that a key part of the reformist agenda following the GLF - such as Zhou Enlai’s Four Modernizations - were basically built around accepting this new economic reality, rather than wasting energy on trying to make another go at establishing a Soviet style command economy.

Interesting point.

If so, then the later economic trajectory of China (into a gigantic de facto capitalist powerhouse) still happens, but the cultural trajectory will be substantially changed - enough to affect the entire world. That's because (AIUI) during the Cultural Revolution, Mao incited the Red Guards to get rid of everything old (the "Four Olds" Campaign), and the Guards destroyed nearly all of China's cultural heritage. They invaded museums and libraries and burned the contents; also private residences. Art, sculpture, and manuscripts were destroyed; ancient buildings such as temples were vandalized or destroyed.

One recent consequence of this is the high prices commanded by Chinese works in the collector markets. Most of what survived was stuff that had left China - sold, often for a pittance, in the early 1900s, to foreigners. One frequent occurrence on Antiques Roadshow is presentation of a Chinese object that some grand-uncle or old family friend picked up in the Far East back then, which is appraised for $20,000 or $50,000. Even 19th century copies of classic works (produced for export) fetch thousands if well-made. AR does "revisit" shows, where they show the original appraisal from say 2005, and what the value would be in 2018 or 2019. With Chinese objects, the value is often 3x-5x greater. This is because there are now lots of very rich people in China who want Chinese antiquities, and the supply is very small - due to the Cultural Revolution.

I’d make another point of comparison between this scenario and having Mao die circa 1956 - - that being the later comes before the “Hundred Flowers” and subsequent “Anti-Rightist Campaign”. Now, said repressions were walked back following Mao’s death OTL during the Boulan Fenzheng period, with most victims being rehabilitated; but would this still happen TTL, without the party trying to walk back the Cultural Revolution? Conversely though, if the depressions are “corrected” only a few years after they happen, would Chinese civil society have a better chance of recovering?

Of course, that’s just one detail; there’s also the question of how this affects China’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the Soviet Union. Now some here will point out that much of the CPC leadership shared Mao’s sentiments of highly regarding Stalin, and disliking Kruschev and his reforms, Deng being a prime example. I can’t help but wonder, however, if any party leader other than Mao could have opened relations with the United States, or would have allowed relations with the Soviets to deteriorate to the point that such ideological heresy was preferable. For that matter, would a post-Mao China try to as aggressively seek leadership of the “world revolution” as Mao himself did OTL? If not, does this mean “Maoist” regimes and revolutions (eg the Khmer Rogue) don’t happen TTL? For that matter, how is Vietnam affected?

There’s also my argument (quoted above) on China economically liberalizing earlier, and what the knock of effects of that could be; or how said economic development is altered by aforementioned alternate US relations. The broad strokes of geopolitics could be massively altered here.

What do you guys think?

CONSOLIDATE: I’m a little torn on whether China is, on the whole, “better” or worse off TTL - - on the one hand, they could see economic growth taking off earlier due to reformers taking power sooner; on the other, Mao not normalizing US relations may mean China doesn’t get to integrate as fully into the world economy. What do you guys think?

 

[Sam R.]

It took for the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and Gang of Four to eliminate enough potential alternate party centres that "sane" "engineers" could force a retreat into the development of capitalism controlled by the party.

1963? You've got like 7 reserve party centres before the bourgeois line takes over. And even if they win the lotto, you're going to see 3 1989 uprisings by the old urban proletariat and the immediatist fractions of the intelligentsia / party.

 

[Seandineen]

I’d make another point of comparison between this scenario and having Mao die circa 1956 - - that being the later comes before the “Hundred Flowers” and subsequent “Anti-Rightist Campaign”. Now, said repressions were walked back following Mao’s death OTL during the Boulan Fenzheng period, with most victims being rehabilitated; but would this still happen TTL, without the party trying to walk back the Cultural Revolution? Conversely though, if the depressions are “corrected” only a few years after they happen, would Chinese civil society have a better chance of recovering?

Of course, that’s just one detail; there’s also the question of how this affects China’s foreign policy, particularly regarding the Soviet Union. Now some here will point out that much of the CPC leadership shared Mao’s sentiments of highly regarding Stalin, and disliking Kruschev and his reforms, Deng being a prime example. I can’t help but wonder, however, if any party leader other than Mao could have opened relations with the United States, or would have allowed relations with the Soviets to deteriorate to the point that such ideological heresy was preferable. For that matter, would a post-Mao China try to as aggressively seek leadership of the “world revolution” as Mao himself did OTL? If not, does this mean “Maoist” regimes and revolutions (eg the Khmer Rogue) don’t happen TTL? For that matter, how is Vietnam affected?

There’s also my argument (quoted above) on China economically liberalizing earlier, and what the knock of effects of that could be; or how said economic development is altered by aforementioned alternate US relations. The broad strokes of geopolitics could be massively altered here.

What do you guys think?

CONSOLIDATE: I’m a little torn on whether China is, on the whole, “better” or worse off TTL - - on the one hand, they could see economic growth taking off earlier due to reformers taking power sooner; on the other, Mao not normalizing US relations may mean China doesn’t get to integrate as fully into the world economy. What do you guys think?

If the Helmsmen does go, could our pals in Albania become the rival reds? Hoxha loved the Stalinist ideal, more than most.

 

[farmerted555]

If the Helmsmen does go, could our pals in Albania become the rival reds? Hoxha loved the Stalinist ideal, more than most.

Hoxha also had a bunker fetish.

 

[Seandineen]

Indeed. I also wonder in post Mao China, what would happen to old Lin Biao? So many possibilites.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Indeed. I also wonder in post Mao China, what would happen to old Lin Biao?

Liu Shaoqui and Zhao Enlai would be best positioned for taking power.

To be honest, I’m not sure what to make of Lin Bao’s OTL 1966 embrace of Mao’s Cult of Personality; AIUI, he hadn’t exactly been known for his political involvement, and if the official explanation of his death is anything to go by, he wasn’t so categorically pro-Mao that he wouldn’t fall out with him. But that’s my far-less-than-expert opinion.

 

[Seandineen]

I know Weng Sheng, Chang Kai-shek's brilliant psychological warfare guru, had hoped to "turn" Mao's Lieutenants. Difficult, yes not entirely impossible

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

I know Weng Sheng, Chang Kai-shek's brilliant psychological warfare guru, had hoped to "turn" Mao's Lieutenants. Difficult, yes not entirely impossible

In 1963? Considering the hold CCP has on mainland China at this point, what would Sheng's endgame even be here (aside from restarting a massive war)?

 

[TastySpam]

1. China had significant economic growth throughout most of the Cultural Revolution, with the exception of 1967, which is when you really had most of the big disturbances (like the Wuhan battle). So I don't buy the Dikotter argument. I don't see a Mao death significantly altering this.

2. I don't view Mao as being a unique driver of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's. The really most important event for this isn't the Cultural Revolution - it's the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which basically sent all kinds of Communist movements careening away from the USSR once Brezhnev made it clear that competing Communists models could be subject to coercion from Moscow. It spooked the Romanians, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs, the Albanians, lots of people. Note that the Sino-Soviet split more or less ends after Brezhnev dies.

3. I don't view the Cultural Revolution as necessary for market reforms. Because the market reforms aren't that unusual. People treat Dengism as this fancy new crazy syncretic ideology invented in China, when it's clearly just generic Bukharinist NEP. And we know this because the supporters of China's market reforms EXPLICITLY cited Bukharin as their model. I think a Soviet-style system was foreclosed in the early 1950's - and a left-communist system was foreclosed by the Great Leap Forward. So some sort of right-communist system I feel would still happen. And titoism isn't likely for just economic material levels of development reasons.

4. I also don't even know if Mao dying butterflies away the Cultural Revolution. Obviously wouldn't happen in the exact same way, but these kind of massive events don't happen in a vacuum. There are definitely a lot of very unusual aspects in early revolutionary China that caused something like that to happen - I think the biggest is that the Communist Revolution by the 60s was wide but not deep (ie, the landlords weren't actually liquidated for the most part, many traditional structures and institutions still stood, KMT holdovers were everywhere, etc.) - combined with one of the largest increases in literacy in human history + a massive population increase. You basically have the first educated generation of young people, much larger than any before them, raised on revolutionary ideals confront a society that did not come anywhere near to their goals/aims/preferences. Something was going to happen.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

1. China had significant economic growth throughout most of the Cultural Revolution, with the exception of 1967, which is when you really had most of the big disturbances (like the Wuhan battle). So I don't buy the Dikotter argument. I don't see a Mao death significantly altering this.

So I'll have more to say later, but I wanted to get a little bit of nitpicking out of the way first -- even when the economy wasn't contracting (as it did in 1967, 68, and 76), growth from 1971-74 didn't match up to later growth periods; all told, 1967 to 1975 saw GDP grow by about 6% a year on average, which while nothing to sneeze at is still notably lower than the over 10% average for subsequent periods (did math for 1979-88 and 1991-2007). (Like I said, a bit of nitpicking.)

 

[Seandineen]

1. China had significant economic growth throughout most of the Cultural Revolution, with the exception of 1967, which is when you really had most of the big disturbances (like the Wuhan battle). So I don't buy the Dikotter argument. I don't see a Mao death significantly altering this.

2. I don't view Mao as being a unique driver of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's. The really most important event for this isn't the Cultural Revolution - it's the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which basically sent all kinds of Communist movements careening away from the USSR once Brezhnev made it clear that competing Communists models could be subject to coercion from Moscow. It spooked the Romanians, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs, the Albanians, lots of people. Note that the Sino-Soviet split more or less ends after Brezhnev dies.

3. I don't view the Cultural Revolution as necessary for market reforms. Because the market reforms aren't that unusual. People treat Dengism as this fancy new crazy syncretic ideology invented in China, when it's clearly just generic Bukharinist NEP. And we know this because the supporters of China's market reforms EXPLICITLY cited Bukharin as their model. I think a Soviet-style system was foreclosed in the early 1950's - and a left-communist system was foreclosed by the Great Leap Forward. So some sort of right-communist system I feel would still happen. And titoism isn't likely for just economic material levels of development reasons.

4. I also don't even know if Mao dying butterflies away the Cultural Revolution. Obviously wouldn't happen in the exact same way, but these kind of massive events don't happen in a vacuum. There are definitely a lot of very unusual aspects in early revolutionary China that caused something like that to happen - I think the biggest is that the Communist Revolution by the 60s was wide but not deep (ie, the landlords weren't actually liquidated for the most part, many traditional structures and institutions still stood, KMT holdovers were everywhere, etc.) - combined with one of the largest increases in literacy in human history + a massive population increase. You basically have the first educated generation of young people, much larger than any before them, raised on revolutionary ideals confront a society that did not come anywhere near to their goals/aims/preferences. Something was going to happen.

If there is no great helmsmen who would the Red Guards worship? Chou is content to be an effective number two, Lin is ill, Keng Sheng needs someone to wind him up.

 

[John Fredrick Parker]

Apologies, I just noticed that I had forgotten to do a follow up post:

2. I don't view Mao as being a unique driver of the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960's. The really most important event for this isn't the Cultural Revolution - it's the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which basically sent all kinds of Communist movements careening away from the USSR once Brezhnev made it clear that competing Communists models could be subject to coercion from Moscow. It spooked the Romanians, the Chinese, the Yugoslavs, the Albanians, lots of people. Note that the Sino-Soviet split more or less ends after Brezhnev dies.

There had been a split pre-1968 though, and after Brezhnev gave his doctrine, Mao offering himself up as a sort of alternate leader for the Communist world certainly played a role; if nothing else, these earlier splits made the Sino-US relations of the 1970's, which had massive geopolitical effects felt to this day.

3. I don't view the Cultural Revolution as necessary for market reforms

Agree with this much; in fact, I'd agree with many that Mao's last dozen or so years of rule actually delayed said market reforms considerably, given how the economic and social devastation of the Great Leap Forward didn't really leave the CCP with many other options, as you allude to.

4. I also don't even know if Mao dying butterflies away the Cultural Revolution.

This is probably the biggest point of contention, and not something I'm ready to dive into just now.