Morocco:
“The first inkling I had that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s predisposition towards us were not all that well was a few months into my assignment. One of the things handled by the United Nations during early 2001 was the situation in Morocco. Morocco had annexed the Western Sahara in 1979 after Mauritania had withdrawn from it. There was a rebellion by a group called the Polisario Front which advocated independence for the Sahrawi people living in the Western Sahara, a ceasefire, and plans for a referendum that had stalled.
The Moroccans had seen the arrangements that we had for East Timor and wanted to propose something similar for Western Sahara: a special administrative region which would nevertheless be part of Morocco. The Indonesian delegation to the United Nations was made aware of Morocco’s interest in such an arrangement though no approach had been made to consult us. The idea ran aground when Annan became aware of it and vetoed it. The official reason was that Morocco should consider a more “relevant and closer example” for regional autonomy, namely the autonomy arrangements they had in Spain.
Even though there was a lot of enthusiasm from Morocco, even from King Muhammad VI, for the arrangement we have in East Timor, I did not push the issue or tried to promote the East Timorese arrangement. The written instructions given to me, which I completely agreed with, by both President Try and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita was that Indonesia should not end up picking a fight with the UN Secretary General. And while Indonesia sympathizes with Morocco’s position and supports it in principle, there is the matter of Indonesia’s much more important relationships with Spain and Algeria to maintain; Spain and Algeria being sympathetic to the Polisario Front’s cause.
My concern was how we’ll manage if we experience some kind of a crisis and would need assistance from the UN if the Secretary General is not friendly towards us.”
From: Representing A Rising Nation by Juwono Sudarsono- Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-200x)
Algeria:
Domestically, things were picking up for Algeria. The civil war the government waged against Islamists came to an end in February 2002. Economically, the government’s finances were in good order and President Abdoulaziz Bouteflika signed an Algeria-EU Associate Agreement to gain access to the European market in December 2001. For Bouteflika, these developments were all well and good for it allowed him to concentrate on foreign policy.
Adopting a non-aligned stance for the New Cold War, Algeria quickly found itself courted by both Russia and the United States a position which it used to full advantage. In July 2001, Bouteflika and President of Russia Yevgeny Primakov signed an agreement in Moscow which would see Russia forgive Algerian debt in exchange for Algerian purchase of Russian weapons. 9/11 and the ambivalent response by Arab states in the gulf would see Algeria experience the United States’ advances. Meeting with President of the United States John McCain in November 2001, Bouteflika declared his support for the War on Terror in exchange for a lift of the weapons embargo placed on Algeria and support for his government in the Algerian Civil War.
Through it all, Bouteflika asserted Algeria’s independence of stance. In supporting the United States in the War on Terror, Algeria rejected the argument put forward by Russia that Islamic nations should not give unconditional support to the steps taken by the United States after 9/11. At the same time, even as he expressed support for the War on Terror, Bouteflika continued to criticize the rigid adherence to the IMF’s policy prescriptions which the United States expects from nations taking on IMF aid regardless of the economic and social consequences. Such consequences, argued Bouteflika in an effort to link what he was saying to the War on Terror, make fertile breeding ground for extremists.
This criticism of rigid adherence to neo-liberal economic prescriptions had caused Bouteflika to turn to the G-15 as the international forum for Algeria to focus on. The 2001 G-15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia were filled with those who had become disillusioned at the IMF’s insistence for strict adherence of its policies most notably Argentina, Turkey, and Kenya. When the 2002 Coup in Venezuela occurred in April 2002 and Interim President of Venezuela Pedro Carmona announced that Venezuela would not be hosting the 2002 G-15 Summit, Bouteflika jumped at the opportunity and volunteered Algiers to host the G-15 Summit. By May 2002, support began to pour in from other members for Algeria to host the G-15 Summit, scheduled for October.
Tunisia:
Tunisia did not have a civil war to content with like its nextdoor neighbour Algeria. Under the leadership of President Zine El Abidine Bin Ali, Tunisia achieved economic prosperity though there were criticisms of inequality, corruption, and repressiveness about the government. With Prime Minister of France Lionel Jospin choosing to distance France, Tunisia’s largest trading partner, from Tunisia it fell to the other “poles” to try filling in the vacuum.
Bin Ali would emulate Boutefilka so far as keeping his nations’ options open were concerned. While supporting the United States in the War on Terror, Bin Ali would continue to call for the sanctions on Iraq to be lifted using the unspoken threat of drifting in Russia’s direction to boost its claim. The United States played it safe in order to gain Tunisia’s support and in February 2002, United States Secretary of State Richard Williamson was in Tunis to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement on behalf of the McCain Administration.
By 2002, Bin Ali had been in power for 15 years with a view to running for re-election in 2004 after a referendum abolished presidential term limits.
Libya:
Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution Muammar Gaddafi smiled at the expression on Fretilin’s Xanana Gusmao’s face. Sitting with them in Gaddafi’s tent, the OPM’s Seth Rumkorem also smiled, thinking that this was probably how he looked when Gaddafi first put forward the idea. The GAM’s Hasan Di Tiro’s smile was more subtle, fitting of a man who had carried the idea in his head for sometime.
“Why is what I’ve said caused such a shock for you? It makes sense, does it not?” asked Gaddafi before repeating his proposal again “The Falintil has taken up arms and failed, the OPM has taken up arms and failed, the GAM has taken up arms and failed…why not combine forces and work together? You bring your resources both men and material and I will provide some assistance from my end.”
Xanana looked at the other men in the room. He kept a poker face.
“I was under the impression that I would be here because you were willing to provide support and assistance for our cause as you have done for countless others”, Xanana said to Gaddafi “But evidently you have other ideas in mind.”
“This idea doesn’t sound the slightest bit interesting to you?” asked Di Tiro.
“Not if you can’t answer the questions I have about your idea”, replied Xanana.
“Then ask away”, encouraged Di Tiro.
“Why not just do what we all have done in the past?” asked Xanana “We’ve risen up and fought against the Republic of Indonesia at the same time; we haven’t coordinated or cooperated, we’ve just simply taken up arms in our respective homelands.”
“The fact that we’re sitting here instead of being over there exchanging diplomatic recognition to each other’s independent homelands says something about whether or not we’ve been successful”, said Rumkorem “We need to combine our strength and attack them at the same time in one place.”
“What about popular support, then?” asked Xanana looking at Rumkorem “In West Papua, they’re building a trans-provincial road with asphalt imported from Trinidad Tobago; in Aceh, I hear there’s more money from the LNG actually going to the refurbishment of schools and hospitals and in Timor Leste, they have a new hospital and a new shopping center in Dili…”
“Roads are also constructed and educational opportunities also expanded under colonialism, which is precisely what the government in Jakarta is doing to our homelands”, countered Di Tiro “Might I also add that gleaming new infrastructure cannot replace the lives lost in Aceh, West Papua, and Timor Leste to the regime in Jakarta whether it be Soekarno, Soeharto, or Try.
“You can’t just ignore the fact that our homelands have done better under Try than under Soeharto”, argued Xanana “Do you think people will sympathize with our cause and rally to us?”
“Such respect and, dareisayit, admiration for Try”, scoffed Gaddafi “Perhaps it was a mistake to ask you to come.”
“No, no, respecting the enemy is good”, defended Di Tiro “There’s a bigger chance of victory that way.”
“And how would I know that Timor Leste would not just merely be working for Aceh’s cause and then be left to dry afterwards?” asked Xanana with a skeptical expression to Di Tiro “Don’t think I don’t know about your friendship with Colonel Gaddafi…this is probably all your idea for all I know…”
“It is indeed because of Mr. Di Tiro and his close relationship with Gaddafi that has made it possible for this meeting to be assembled”, replied Rumkorem “And you’re right to have the concerns that you have but you’ll realize that things will be different, once the people in those three provinces and our own movements see that we have a real chance at victory…”
“The Republic of Indonesia is strong and getting stronger under the leadership of Try”, said Di Tiro “We must make our move together and soon before they become too strong to be stopped.”
Xanana looked around at the other men in the room and then finally made his decision.
“What will the Falintil, the OPM, and the GAM joining forces against Indonesia entail exactly?” asked Xanana.
Gaddafi broke into a smile at that.
“Ah, so good to see everybody getting along so well”, said Gaddafi as he stood up and got ready to leave “But I must go and do some errands now, I’ll let you three freedom fighters discuss about whatever it is you need to discuss.”
Egypt:
President Hosni Mubarak would confess that he’d always felt an affinity with Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno pointing to the fact that they were third in a line of “strongman leaders” in each’s respective nations. Mubarak was known to have said to an Indonesian delegation visiting him in 2001 that “There’s Nasser, Sadat, and me just as there is Soekarno, Soeharto, and Try”. For his part, Try felt that Indonesia should show deference to both Egypt and Mubarak when it comes to international matters both on account of Egypt’s prominence and on account of Egypt being the first nation in the world to recognize Indonesia’s independence.
Further down the ranks of the Indonesian government, the deference to Egypt was more ambiguous. Within BAKIN, the sentiment about Mubarak’s regime was that whilst it is true that the regime had been tough on Islamists and radicals, it could still be considered a failure given that Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s number two and some of the terrorists that perpetrated 9/11 were Egyptian. The Department of Defense and Security and ABRI Headquarters would think out loud saying that having a military like Egypt’s is probably a goal worth having for Indonesia’s military. The Department of Economics and National Development Planning, however, would counter that there was no point for Egypt to have a military like it did if its economy was stagnant.
Indonesia would do its part for the Egyptian economy by becoming a market for Egyptian commodities. Taking advantage of Egypt’s multiple devaluations of the Egyptian Pound throughout 2001, Indonesian Minister of Trade Anthony Salim signed an agreement to import Egyptian cotton, an important commodity in that country, to Indonesia.
The effusiveness which Mubarak showed for Try, especially in the wake of the latter’s crackdown on Islamists in late January 2001, and the latter’s deference would prove to be pivotal. After Try’s “I’m no moderate” speech at the 2001 APEC Summit in October 2001, it was Mubarak who McCain turned to for advice about how he should “handle Indonesia”. Mubarak told McCain that the latter already knew what to do but would proceed to give what could only be described as a strong recommendation saying that if the United States could not get unequivocal support from the cradle of the Islamic world in its War on Terror, the next best thing would be to get the support of the world’s largest Islamic nation.
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And we are done with Africa. There will be a few weeks between this one and the next update.
Indonesia’s relationship with Algeria will be further explored in the main TL.
OTL, Venezuela was supposed to host the 2002 G-15 Summit but cancelled it because of political instability. It would not be until 2004 that a G-15 Summit is hosted again with Venezuela at last getting to host the summit. In ITTL, Algeria and other prominent developing nations are anxious to establish the G-15 as a forum for cooperation in the multipolar world.
In OTL, Gaddafi has been positively identified as a backer of the GAM. With the OPM and Timor Leste’s struggle for independence he is only a “reported” supporter.
nasional.tempo.co
Free Online Library: Libyan terrorism: the case against Gaddafi. by "Contemporary Review"; News, opinion and commentary Literature, writing, book reviews Terrorism
www.thefreelibrary.com
There is little evidence to suggests that the various separatist movements in Indonesia have seriously cooperated with each other on the battlefield but if this post in Quora suggests that they show solidarity with each other and their overseas branches demonstrate together against Indonesia (
https://id.quora.com/Bagaimana-hubungan-pemberontak-GAM-di-Aceh-dengan-OPM-di-Papua). There is still one more separatist group, the RMS, but I’ll safe that for later.
I know I promised that Gaddafi will explain himself in the current update but I tried writing it multiple times and did not work out so I will safe that for later too.